A Fair Competition Theory of the Civil False Claims Act by Kwok, David
Nebraska Law Review
Volume 94 | Issue 2 Article 4
2015
A Fair Competition Theory of the Civil False
Claims Act
David Kwok
University of Houston Law Center, dykwok@central.uh.edu
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.unl.edu/nlr
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law, College of at DigitalCommons@University of Nebraska - Lincoln. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Nebraska Law Review by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@University of Nebraska - Lincoln.
Recommended Citation
David Kwok, A Fair Competition Theory of the Civil False Claims Act, 94 Neb. L. Rev. 355 (2015)
Available at: https://digitalcommons.unl.edu/nlr/vol94/iss2/4
David Kwok*
A Fair Competition Theory of the
Civil False Claims Act
TABLE OF CONTENTS
I. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 356
II. Background on the False Claims Act . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 359
III. The Problem of “Technical” Contract Violations . . . . . . . . 361
A. Pre-Contract Formation Fraud. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 362
B. Post-Contract Formation Fraud . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 363
1. Express False Certification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 364
2. Implied False Certification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 365
3. Condition of Payment vs. Participation . . . . . . . . . 365
4. Materiality . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 367
IV. The Failure of Implied False Certification Doctrine . . . . 368
A. Implied Certification Lacks Transparency . . . . . . . . . . 368
B. Limiting Implied Certification Lacks Statutory and
Legislative Support . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 369
C. Limited FCA Liability Leads to Underenforcement . 370
1. Low Direct Harm and Constrained Enforcement
Resources . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 370
2. Costs of Detecting and Sanctioning Non-
Compliance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 371
3. Regulatory Capture . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 372
4. Failure to Prioritize Incapacitation . . . . . . . . . . . . . 373
5. Failure to Consider Competitive Harm . . . . . . . . . 374
D. Unnecessary Risks for Whistleblowers . . . . . . . . . . . . . 376
V. Proposal: The Fair Competition Theory of the FCA . . . . 376
A. An Instrumental View of Hobbs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 376
B. A Fair Competition Approach to the FCA . . . . . . . . . . 378
1. Cost of Compliance as a Sanction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 379
© Copyright held by the NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW
* Assistant Professor, University of Houston Law Center.  The author wishes to
thank Nicole Huberfeld, Joan Krause, Zack Buck, Darren Bush, Zachary Bray,
Teddy Rave, and Dave Fagundes, along with the participants at the 2014 ASLME
Health Law Professors Conference, the 2014 Developing Ideas Conference, and
the UHLC Works-In-Progress for their help in bringing this piece to fruition.
Thank you also to Veronica Manning for her research and editing assistance, and
to the editors of the Nebraska Law Review for their diligent work.  Naturally, any
remaining errors are the author’s alone.
355
356 NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 94:355
2. Limited Defenses Regarding No Competitive
Harm . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 381
a. Competitive Market with No One in
Compliance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 381
b. De Minimis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 381
c. Government Knowledge . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 382
3. Defenses that Courts Should Not Consider . . . . . 383
a. Actual Market Competitiveness . . . . . . . . . . . . 383
b. Lack of Gains or Payment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 384
C. Two Alternatives to the Fair Competition
Proposal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 384
1. Judicial Deference for Intervened Cases . . . . . . . . 384
2. Express Adoption of Cost-Benefit Analysis . . . . . 385
VI. Fair Competition’s Superiority Over the Status Quo . . . 386
A. Transparency and Predictability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 386
B. Closer to Statutory and Legislative Intent . . . . . . . . . 387
C. Improved Regulatory Enforcement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 388
1. Private Enforcers Care About Competitive
Markets . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 389
2. The Contracting Agency Has Some Comparative
Concern for Competitive Markets . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 389
3. Fair, Competitive Markets Are Part of the
Underlying Premise of the FCA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 390
4. Government Control of Litigation Limits the
Downside of Private Enforcement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 391
VII. Concerns . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 391
A. Materiality . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 391
B. Overcriminalization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 393
C. Excessive Compliance Costs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 396
D. Stigmatic Concerns in Incorporating Technical
Violations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 396
E. Increased Liability Only for Those with Government
Contracts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 397
F. Potentially Anti-Competitive Application of FCA
Liability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 398
VIII. Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 400
I. INTRODUCTION
Whistleblowers are helping recover over $5 billion a year of fraud
against the federal government under the False Claims Act,1 but reli-
ance on whistleblowers and prosecutorial discretion raises challenges
1. Press Release, Dep’t of Justice, Justice Department Recovers Nearly $6 Billion
from False Claims Act Cases in Fiscal Year 2014 (Nov. 20, 2014) [hereinafter
Dep’t of Justice Press Release], archived at http://perma.unl.edu/32CG-VNQQ.
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when fraud allegations incorporate knowingly undisclosed regulatory
violations.2  On the spectrum of fraud charges, criminal charges fit the
cases with the worst behavior: a healthcare provider billing Medicare
for a service that is never actually provided.3  Such behavior estab-
lishes clear losses for the government.  More difficult, and the focus of
this Article, is the distinction between civil fraud and non-culpable be-
havior under the civil False Claims Act (FCA).  Does failure to disclose
a known regulatory violation constitute civil liability under the FCA?
Given the common difficulty in measuring the resultant harm, courts
have struggled to articulate a cohesive regime of civil FCA liability for
such clear regulatory violations.
For example, what if a provider billing Medicare knowingly identi-
fies the wrong physician associated with an otherwise legitimate, ef-
fective healthcare service?  Under existing case law, knowingly
identifying the wrong physician supervisor does not generate civil lia-
bility under the FCA, but knowingly identifying the wrong physician
provider does generate civil liability.4  Courts use formalistic doctrines
to find that some companies “implicitly” certify false compliance with
regulations and thus are liable,5 while others do not implicitly certify
compliance and thus are not liable.6  This erratic civil liability creates
problems for all involved parties.  Companies doing business with the
government face uncertain liability in addressing regulatory compli-
ance, as they may encounter dramatically different sanctions for simi-
lar regulatory violations.  The government and society likely suffer
underenforcement of regulatory violations, resulting in unnecessary
risks from excess violations and misuse of government funds.
Whistleblowers helping expose violations under the FCA may be less
likely to come forward, wary of the risk that some clear, knowing regu-
latory violations are not legally actionable.
2. See, e.g., United States ex. rel. Mikes v. Straus, 274 F.3d 687, 697 (2d Cir. 2001)
(rejecting FCA liability if compliance failure “is only tangential to the service for
which reimbursement is sought”).
3. See, e.g., Brief for the United States as Appellee at 10, United States ex rel. Shutt
v. Cmty. Home & Health Care Servs., 305 F. App’x 358 (9th Cir. 2008) (No. 07-
56060), 2008 WL 937385.  The difference between criminal and civil sanctions as
applied to corporate defendants is not always readily apparent. See, e.g., Susan
R. Klein, Redrawing the Criminal-Civil Boundary, 2 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 679
(1999); Carol S. Steiker, Punishment and Procedure: Punishment Theory and the
Criminal-Civil Procedural Divide, 85 GEO. L.J. 775 (1997).
4. Compare United States ex rel. Hobbs v. MedQuest Assocs., Inc., 711 F.3d 707 (6th
Cir. 2013) (finding no FCA liability for improperly identified supervising physi-
cian), with United States v. Mackby, 261 F.3d 821 (9th Cir. 2001) (upholding FCA
liability for improperly identified physician provider).
5. See, e.g., Ab-Tech Constr., Inc. v. United States, 31 Fed. Cl. 429 (1994) (noting a
falsely implied certification of compliance with Small Business Act), aff’d, 57 F.3d
1084 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
6. See, e.g., Hobbs, 711 F.3d 707.
358 NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 94:355
In this Article, I propose a new reading of the civil False Claims
Act that is anchored on the principle of fair competition among those
doing business with the government.  Instead of focusing solely on
punishment for the deception and immediate loss caused by a poten-
tial defendant, the FCA should be read as a solution to the problem
that falsity and violations will occur in the government contracting
process.  A focus on fair competition comports with the FCA’s goal of
providing a level playing field for government business.
This reading flows naturally from the history of the FCA.  The fed-
eral government does not itself produce all of the goods and services it
uses, but it instead contracts with the private sector for certain
needs.7  The private sector ostensibly is superior to direct government
production in providing those needs, due in part to competition and
specialization.  If, however, some private companies are more success-
ful by secretly violating contracts in their government business with-
out repercussions, then reliance on the private contracts becomes
troubling.8  By paying whistleblowers for information, the FCA fur-
ther leverages the private sector to help detect and combat fraud.9
Private entities can thus help the government through two distinct
paths: by (1) producing goods and services per government contracts,
and (2) revealing contractual breaches in existing government
contracts.
The result of this competitive marketplace focus is that clear tech-
nical violations should normally be subject to FCA liability.  Compli-
ance with technical elements of contracts and regulatory schemes is
costly; allowing a government contractor to avoid compliance costs
may grant it a competitive advantage over other entities.  In the long
run, such a contractor may be able to push out competitors and obtain
market power.  Without competitors, the lone contractor may face lit-
tle incentive to improve on pricing or services.  The government then
may pay more for inferior services, and this is the harm the FCA is
well-equipped to address.  Even though the precise level of competi-
tive, long-term harm is difficult to measure, the underlying compli-
ance costs are more easily measurable.  Correcting inequities
regarding non-compliance should help ameliorate the long-term com-
petitive harms.
Courts can facilitate this application of the FCA by moving away
from the excessively formalistic false certification doctrines and in-
stead adopting a fair competition approach.  Under this fair competi-
7. See J. Randy Beck, The False Claims Act and the English Eradication of Qui Tam
Legislation, 78 N.C. L. REV. 539, 555 (2000) (discussing military reliance on pri-
vate small arms manufacturing).
8. See, e.g., id. (addressing the problem of defective weapons in the military).
9. See 31 U.S.C. § 3730 (2012) (authorizing whistleblower payment of up to 30% of
the government recoveries under the FCA).
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tion approach, if a defendant knows that it has committed a clear
regulatory violation and bills the government without disclosing the
violation, courts should presume the existence of competitive harm.
The cost of compliance is a rough, low-end estimate for the sanction.
This approach allows courts to focus upon their core competencies:
identifying clear regulatory violations and determining the defen-
dant’s mens rea.  The FCA’s statutory procedures require extensive
Department of Justice (DOJ) participation in the litigation process.
Courts should rely on the DOJ and the contracting government agen-
cies to evaluate the precise impact of violations on competitive mar-
kets.  Since the DOJ can unilaterally dismiss any case over the
objection of the whistleblowers, courts can set a bright-line rule re-
garding competitive harm without fear of abusive private litigation.  If
the DOJ allows the litigation to proceed, courts should presume that
clear regulatory violations cause competitive harms.  This broad pre-
sumption of FCA liability will support society’s interest in government
transparency and accountability, and it will facilitate the crucial role
of whistleblowers in bringing difficult-to-detect violations to light.
I begin with some background on the False Claims Act in Part II.
Part III outlines the present judicial doctrines that address clear regu-
latory violations in the government contracting context.  Part IV de-
scribes the various problems with the existing doctrines, and Part V
outlines the fair competition approach to the FCA.  Part VI covers the
numerous advantages of the proposal, and Part VII addresses a num-
ber of related concerns under the FCA.
II. BACKGROUND ON THE FALSE CLAIMS ACT
The False Claims Act is one of the most prominent tools used to
combat fraud against the federal government.  The FCA targets false
or fraudulent behavior against the federal government through the
imposition of both civil10 and criminal11 liability.  The civil FCA gen-
erally focuses on “false or fraudulent claims” made to the federal gov-
ernment.12  Defendants who knowingly make false claims for payment
are liable, and the statute defines “knowingly” as a person who “acts
in reckless disregard of the truth or falsity of the information; and
require[s] no proof of specific intent to defraud.”13
Originally, the statute was enacted to address the problem of de-
fective goods being provided to the military during the Civil War.14
Specifically, Congress was aware of the difficulties in assigning blame
for defective war supplies:
10. 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729–3733 (2012).
11. 18 U.S.C. § 287 (2012).
12. 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a).
13. 31 U.S.C. § 3729(b)(1).
14. See Beck, supra note 7, at 554–65 (discussing the history of the FCA).
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Necessity, haste and carelessness can explain the acceptance of a great many
of these contracts and a very great deal of inferior goods.  But a large amount
of blame must go to a horde of government-paid officials who, either through
criminal negligence or criminal collusion, permitted or encouraged this rob-
bing of the government treasury and cruelty to the American soldier * * * .
Accused inspectors passed the blame on to those letting the contracts, the lat-
ter blamed the contractors, and the contractors in turn contended that they
furnished goods according to specification.15
Due to the challenge of detecting and prosecuting such offenses,
Congress incorporated qui tam provisions into the FCA.16  The qui
tam provisions allowed private litigants known as relators to pursue
civil actions and prosecute cases of fraud in lieu of the Department of
Justice.17  Upon successful prosecution of a case, relators received a
portion of the recoveries against the defendant.18  The qui tam provi-
sion’s purpose was “to hold out to a confederate a strong temptation to
betray his coconspirator.”19
The qui tam provisions fell into disuse around World War II, but
they received renewed attention in 1986 when Congress enhanced the
reward structure.20  Legislators noted the need to provide sufficient
incentives for the disclosure of fraud and the limited DOJ enforcement
efforts.21  The Senate recognized the FCA’s importance in “deterring
fraud.”22
Today, relators can receive as much as 30% of the civil recovery,
which can be substantial given the treble damages provisions in the
statute.23  Civil penalties also include $5,500 to $11,000 in fines per
false claim.24  While modern relators have great flexibility in filing
civil FCA actions against companies they suspect are defrauding the
federal government,25 they must follow unusual statutory procedures
before proceeding with litigation.26  The DOJ has the first right of re-
15. United States ex rel. Marcus v. Hess, 127 F.2d 233, 236 (3d Cir. 1942) (alterations
in original) (quoting 1 FRED. A. SHANNON, ORGANIZATION AND ADMINISTRATION OF
THE UNION ARMY, 56–58 (1928)) (internal quotation marks omitted), rev’d, 317
U.S. 537 (1943).
16. See Beck, supra note 7, at 554–65.
17. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b) (2012).
18. See id.
19. See Beck, supra note 7, at 556 n.64 (citing CONG. GLOBE, 37th Cong., 3d Sess.
955–56 (1863) (statement of Sen. Jacob M. Howard)).
20. See Beck, supra note 7, at 554–65 (discussing the history of the usage of qui tam
provisions).
21. See id. at 563–64.
22. United States v. Mackby, 261 F.3d 821 (9th Cir. 2001) (quoting S. REP. NO. 99-
345, at 4 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5266, 5269).
23. See 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(1) (2012).
24. See 28 C.F.R. §§ 71.3, 76.3 (2014).
25. See Vt. Agency of Natural Res. v. United States ex rel. Stevens, 529 U.S. 765,
771–78 (2000) (describing how relators do not have to satisfy the modern require-
ment of standing).
26. See 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b) (2012).
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fusal over any case,27 and the DOJ may also unilaterally dismiss any
case despite relator objection.28
In 2009, Congress passed the Fraud Enforcement and Recovery
Act of 2009 (FERA),29 which made some changes to the FCA.  Of par-
ticular note, prior to 2009, the FCA did not contain any explicit refer-
ence to materiality.  FERA added “materiality” to particular causes of
action, namely §§ 3729(a)(1)(B) and 3729(a)(1)(G).  It defined materi-
ality as “having a natural tendency to influence, or be capable of influ-
encing, the payment or receipt of money or property.”30
III. THE PROBLEM OF “TECHNICAL” CONTRACT
VIOLATIONS
One recurring problem in determining liability for FCA violations
lies in the complex statutory and regulatory regimes surrounding gov-
ernment contracts.  If a company agrees to a government contract and
commits a regulatory violation, can it be held liable under the FCA?
In particular, this Article refers only to companies that have commit-
ted clear, knowing violations of unambiguous regulatory or contrac-
tual requirements.31  As shorthand, I refer to these as regulatory
violations.  The parties are not debating whether a regulatory viola-
tion occurred, but rather whether the violation should legally generate
civil FCA liability.  The government or the relator argues that the de-
fendant’s contract fulfillment is deceptive or fraudulent because the
defendant knows of a regulatory violation but fails to disclose it to the
government.  I do not address challenges regarding the reasonable-
ness of different interpretations of ambiguous regulations or con-
tracts.32  I also do not focus on mens rea, but as indicated by the
statute, the defendant must satisfy the knowing mens rea of the
offense.33
Courts have shown hesitation in allowing FCA liability for regula-
tory violations, concerned with overly broad FCA enforcement.34
While regulatory violations are evidence of wrongdoing, courts may be
27. See id.
28. See 31 U.S.C. § 3730(c)(2)(A).
29. Fraud Enforcement and Recovery Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-21, 123 Stat. 1617
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 18 U.S.C. and 31 U.S.C.).
30. See 31 U.S.C. § 3729(b)(4) (2012).
31. A rough analogy would be to say these are clear violations of a rule rather than a
standard. See Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards: An Economic Analysis, 42
DUKE L.J. 557 (1992).
32. See CLAIRE M. SYLVIA, THE FALSE CLAIMS ACT: FRAUD AGAINST THE GOVERNMENT
§ 4.31 (2d ed. 2010).
33. 31 U.S.C. § 3729(b)(1).  The FCA is not a strict liability statute. See SYLVIA,
supra note 32, at § 4.31.
34. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Hobbs v. MedQuest Assocs., Inc., 711 F.3d 707, 717
(6th Cir. 2013).
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uncertain if the FCA is the proper route of enforcement.  The Ninth
Circuit, for example, held a healthcare provider liable under the FCA
for knowingly misleading the government by submitting physical
therapy bills under a different doctor’s identity.35  In contrast, the
Sixth Circuit held that a healthcare provider was not liable under the
FCA for knowingly submitting medical imaging bills involving unap-
proved doctor supervision.36
Regulatory violations may constitute fraud in two distinct circum-
stances.  First, there could be fraud in the inducement, also known as
pre-contract-formation fraud.37  Pre-contract formation fraud occurs,
for example, when a defendant does not intend to perform the contract
at the time it signs the contract.38  The other circumstance in which
regulatory violations may constitute fraud occurs after the contract is
signed.  Post-contract formation fraud occurs when, after a defendant
signs a contract, it subsequently commits a violation in performance of
the contract but invoices the government as if it had properly
performed.
A. Pre-Contract Formation Fraud
Fraud in the inducement covers a variety of problems occurring
pre-contract formation; one example is bid-rigging.39  Under this the-
ory, fraud at the initial point of contract formation renders subsequent
related business fraudulent.40  For example, in Marcus v. Hess, elec-
trical contractors colluded to “remove all possible competition” in bid-
ding for government projects in the Pittsburgh area.41  Many, but not
all, of the contractors certified that their bids were genuine and non-
collusive.42  After completing the bidding process, the contractors sub-
mitted monthly estimates for payment.43  Specifically, the Court held
35. See United States v. Mackby, 261 F.3d 821, 824 (9th Cir. 2001).
36. See Hobbs, 711 F.3d at 717.
37. See SYLVIA, supra note 32, at §§ 4.29, 4.35.
38. See, e.g., United States v. Lockheed Martin Eng’g & Sci. Servs. Co., 491 F.3d 254,
259 (5th Cir. 2007) (“[Relator] must prove . . . that Lockheed had no intention to
perform the research contract according to the terms of the [offer].” (alterations in
original) (citing United States. ex rel. Willard v. Humana Health Plan of Tex.
Inc., 336 F.3d 375, 384 (5th Cir. 2003))); United States v. United Techs. Corp.,
626 F.3d 313, 320 (6th Cir. 2010), as amended (Jan. 24, 2011) (holding improper
cost estimate in defendant’s offer is sufficient basis for FCA liability).
39. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Miller v. Bill Harbert Int’l Constr., Inc., 608 F.3d
871 (D.C. Cir. 2010).  It is unclear whether an unsuccessful bid-rigging attempt
can be a basis for FCA liability. See United States ex rel. Taylor v. Gabelli, 345 F.
Supp. 2d 313, 335–36 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) (finding no liability for unsuccessful bid-
rigging).
40. United States ex rel. Marcus v. Hess, 317 U.S. 537, 543 (1943).
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Id.
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that the contractors’ subsequent estimates for work were a sufficient
basis for FCA liability.44  The Court noted that the “fraud did not
spend itself with the execution of the [initial] contract.  Its taint en-
tered into every swollen [subsequent] estimate which was the basic
cause for payment of every dollar paid.”45
Similarly, the Fifth Circuit in United States ex rel. Longhi v. Lith-
ium Power Technologies, Inc. held that Lithium Power violated the
FCA when it misled the Department of Defense’s (DoD) Small Busi-
ness Innovation Research (SBIR) program.46  In Longhi, Lithium
Power misrepresented its capabilities and personnel figures in order
to qualify for $1.6 million in SBIR grants.47  Even though Lithium
Power ultimately utilized the grants to develop batteries the DoD
found to be satisfactory, their misrepresentation resulted in liability
for a trebled damages award of $4.9 million ($1.6 million multiplied by
three).48  The court explained that the purpose of the SBIR grant pro-
gram was to award money to eligible deserving small businesses.49
The government lost the intangible benefit of “providing an ‘eligible
deserving’ business with the grants.”50  Because these benefits were
“impossible to calculate, it [was] appropriate to value damages in the
amount the government actually paid to the Defendants.”51  The court
thus upheld the $4.9 million award.52
B. Post-Contract Formation Fraud (False Certification)
The second possibility for incurring liability under the FCA occurs
after the contract has been formed.  Perhaps due to difficulty in estab-
lishing ex ante mens rea regarding regulatory violations, more diffi-
cult cases of regulatory violations have been raised in the post-
contract formation context.  Liability for these post-contract formation
violations generally occurs at the point of invoicing.  These cases are
known as “false certification” cases because the defendant has falsely
certified through the invoice that it has complied with the government
contract.
When a defendant is charged with FCA violations for having failed
to comport with a technical requirement in a contract or regulation,
courts have been hesitant to impose liability, given concerns with
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. United States ex rel. Longhi v. Lithium Power Techs., Inc., 575 F.3d 458 (5th Cir.
2009).
47. Id. at 464.
48. Id. at 472.
49. Id. at 473.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Id.
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overly broad FCA enforcement.53  If there is a complex regulatory re-
gime surrounding performance of the contract, minor technical viola-
tions may not seem sufficiently harmful to justify punishment as
fraud.54  This concern may be stigmatic in nature—that a minor tech-
nical violation, even if the defendant knowingly committed the viola-
tion, should not be labeled as fraud.
Alternatively, the underlying concern may simply be that the sanc-
tion for the regulatory violation should not greatly outweigh the harm
from the violation.  The harm from a regulatory violation may be diffi-
cult to establish, and a resulting problem is the calculation of dam-
ages.  Since so much of the judicial system strives to impose liability in
an attempt to remedy the harm caused, courts are uncertain how to
assess liability when the harm caused is not immediately evident or is
difficult to determine.  For example, in Ab-Tech, the contractor did not
comply with the terms of the Small Business Act.  Nonetheless, the
contractor did construct the automated data processing facility in ac-
cordance with the physical specifications.55  While the government
paid $1.4 million to Ab-Tech and requested $4.2 million plus interest
as trebled damages, the court found there were no damages to
treble.56  “[V]iewed strictly as a capital investment, the Government
got essentially what it paid for.”57
A third potential version of this argument is that the government
did not care about the regulatory violation and thus would have paid
for the good or service regardless of the violation.  Therefore, courts
argue, there is no reason to penalize the defendant for the regulatory
violation.58
For some or all of the above reasons, courts have applied a variety
of approaches in limiting civil FCA liability for regulatory violations.
1. Express False Certification
The doctrine of express certification is relatively uncontroversial: a
defendant becomes liable under the FCA for a regulatory violation by
“falsely certifying that it is in compliance with regulations which are
prerequisites to Government payment in connection with the claim for
53. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Hobbs v. MedQuest Assocs., Inc., 711 F.3d 707, 717
(6th Cir. 2013).
54. See United States ex. rel. Mikes v. Straus, 274 F.3d 687, 697 (2d Cir. 2001) (re-
jecting FCA liability if compliance failure “is only tangential to the service for
which reimbursement is sought”).
55. Ab-Tech Constr., Inc. v. United States, 31 Fed. Cl. 429, 434 (1994), aff’d, 57 F.3d
1084 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. See Mikes, 274 F.3d at 697 (“[I]t would be anomalous to find liability when the
alleged noncompliance would not have influenced the government’s decision to
pay.”).
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payment of federal funds.”59  While the defendant may not have
known about the regulatory violation prior to contract formation, this
doctrine considers whether a defendant subsequently certifies or af-
firms its compliance post-contract formation.60  If the defendant
knows it is not in compliance yet certifies otherwise, that false certifi-
cation is a false claim under the statute and thus generates FCA
liability.61
2. Implied False Certification
The more difficult question occurs if the defendant has not ex-
pressly certified compliance with the relevant regulatory regime.  Not
every post-contract formation invoice incorporates an explicit formal
compliance certification, so courts have also read in implied certifica-
tion under certain circumstances.62  In Ab-Tech, for example, the U.S.
Army Corps of Engineers awarded a contract to Ab-Tech as part of a
program supporting minority-owned small businesses.63  After the
contract award, the United States discovered that Ab-Tech had made
improper arrangements with a non-minority-owned business in viola-
tion of the program rules.64  The court held that Ab-Tech’s progress
payment vouchers in the course of performing the contract were an
“implied certification” of continuing adherence to the requirements of
the small business program.65
3. Condition of Payment vs. Participation
Some courts have restricted the implied false certification doctrine
by distinguishing between conditions of payment versus conditions of
participation.66  The Sixth Circuit embraces this restriction.  It gener-
ally recognizes the false certification theory of FCA liability in which a
defendant “knowingly falsely certifies that it has complied with a stat-
ute or regulation the compliance with which is a condition for Govern-
ment payment [from Medicare funds],” and this certification may be
59. United States ex rel. Wilkins v. United Health Grp., Inc., 659 F.3d 295, 305 (3d
Cir. 2011).
60. See United States ex rel. Hendow v. Univ. of Phoenix, 461 F.3d 1166, 1172 (9th
Cir. 2006) (“So long as the statement in question is knowingly false when made, it
matters not whether it is a certification, assertion, statement, or secret hand-
shake; False Claims liability can attach.”).
61. See id.
62. See Ab-Tech, 31 Fed. Cl. 429 (noting a falsely-implied certification of compliance
with Small Business Act).
63. Id. at 432.
64. Id. at 432–33.
65. Id. at 433–34.
66. See United States ex. rel. Mikes v. Straus, 274 F.3d 687, 700–01 (2d Cir. 2001);
United States ex rel. Wilkins v. United Health Grp., Inc., 659 F.3d 295, 307 (3d
Cir. 2011).
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express or implied.67  If the defendant’s certification is a “condition of
participation” in the Medicare program, however, there is no FCA
liability.68
The Sixth Circuit recently struck down an $11 million FCA award
in United States ex rel. Hobbs v. MedQuest Associates, Inc., holding
that “the ‘blunt[ness]’ of the FCA’s hefty fines and penalties makes
them an inappropriate tool for ensuring compliance with technical and
local program requirements.”69  In Hobbs, the DOJ and a
whistleblower brought an FCA action against MedQuest, a diagnostic
testing company.  They alleged that MedQuest used non-approved su-
pervising physicians at two testing facilities.70  When MedQuest en-
rolled two of its facilities as Medicare providers, it named specific
board-certified radiologists as “supervising physicians” for the facili-
ties.71  The Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) requires
that those named radiologists supervise contrast MRI and CT scans.72
MedQuest acknowledged that it hired other physicians after enroll-
ment and that some of those physicians, who were not radiologists,
supervised contrast MRI and CT scans.73  The district court granted
summary judgment against MedQuest.74
The Sixth Circuit held there was no express certification by Med-
Quest.  While the enrollment form specified that the supervising phy-
sicians expressly claimed to “abide by the Medicare laws, regulations,
and program instructions,” the court noted that the Government did
not demonstrate any MedQuest intent to violate those regulations at
the time of enrollment.75  “Moreover, the certification does not contain
language conditioning payment on compliance with any particular law
or regulation.”76  The court noted that the only express certification on
the CMS-1500 claim form was that the services were “medically indi-
cated and necessary for the health of the patient.”77
67. United States ex rel. Hobbs v. MedQuest Assocs., Inc., 711 F.3d 707, 717 (6th Cir.
2013) (emphasis added) (citing Wilkins, 659 F.3d at 305; Chesbrough v. VPA,
P.C., 655 F.3d 461, 467 (6th Cir. 2011)).
68. Id. at 714 (citing Wilkins, 659 F.3d at 309; United States ex rel. Conner v. Salina
Reg’l Health Ctr., Inc., 543 F.3d 1211, 1220 (10th Cir. 2008); Mikes, 274 F.3d at
701–02).
69. Id. at 717.
70. The DOJ and the whistleblower also alleged improper usage of a former physi-
cian’s billing code, and the district court also granted summary judgment against
MedQuest on this improper usage count. See id. at 712.
71. Id. at 711.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 714–15.
76. Id. at 715.
77. Id. at 715.
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The Sixth Circuit also held there was no implied certification by
MedQuest.  It noted that federal statutes and regulations did not spec-
ify the requirement of radiologist supervision.78  Rather, the require-
ment for radiologist supervision of contrast MRI and CT scans came
from the Local Medical Review Policies (LMRP), the set of policies
specified by the CMS-selected local Medicare carrier.79  The court held
that signing the CMS-1500 claim form did not implicitly certify com-
pliance with the LMRP.80  The court also signaled that the LMRP only
denied payment for limited reasons, and lack of radiology training was
not one of those reasons.81  Furthermore, an LMRP appendix ac-
knowledged that a testing facility failing to meet a credentialing crite-
rion could continue to operate for up to a year while obtaining the
proper credential or licensure.82
Cumulatively, the Sixth Circuit reversed the trial court’s grant of
summary judgment, holding that there was neither express certifica-
tion to a condition of payment nor implied certification to a condition
of payment.  Rather than allowing FCA liability, the court suggested
that compliance could instead “be enforced administratively through
suspension, disqualification, or other remedy.”83
4. Materiality
One other response to the problem of technical violations has been
materiality analysis: while the pre-2009 FCA did not contain an ex-
press materiality requirement, some courts read in materiality as an
element of an FCA violation.84  Other courts and commentators have
already discussed the statutory and doctrinal bases for such a materi-
ality imputation, so I do not explore those here.85  The basic idea is
that some regulatory violations are immaterial and thus not subject to
FCA liability; I address some doctrinal variations in section VII.A.
Nonetheless, I raise the issue of materiality here because courts
are divided, not only on the relevance of materiality in the FCA, but
also on the intersection of materiality with false certification.  Some
courts have described false certification and materiality as indepen-
78. Id. at 715–17.
79. Id. at 711.
80. Id. at 717.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 717.
84. See James B. Helmer, Jr. & Robert M. Rice, The False Claims Act and Implied
Certification: An Update on the State of the Law, 34 FALSE CLAIMS ACT & QUI TAM
Q. REV. 51, 64–65 (2004) (summarizing implied certification doctrines and
describing courts’ search for a “sufficient nexus between payment and adherence
to the particular contract term, regulation, rule or statute violated”).
85. See SYLVIA, supra note 32, at § 4.49.
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dent issues.86  Other courts have explicitly rejected portions of false
certification and relied on materiality as a limitation for FCA liabil-
ity.87  The Fifth Circuit has suggested that false certification doctrines
are a substitute for materiality analysis.  In a pre-FERA case, the
Fifth Circuit noted that false certification doctrines drive at the issue
of materiality, limiting FCA liability to “material misrepresentations
made to qualify for government privileges or services.”88
IV. THE FAILURE OF IMPLIED FALSE
CERTIFICATION DOCTRINE
Courts’ hesitation to apply FCA sanctions to regulatory violations
has resulted in the patchwork, inconsistent doctrines that make liabil-
ity unpredictable.  In reality, implied false certification is misleading
and formalistic.  It is hard to imagine a scenario in which any person
makes a claim to the government for money and is not at least implic-
itly agreeing to follow government regulations or terms.  Why should a
claim for government funds be any less deceptive or harmful if it does
not include the magic phrase, “I certify that I am in compliance with
government regulations”?89  The present regime offers ambiguity as to
the default assumption regarding clear compliance issues.  As applied,
the various false certification doctrines generally operate to reduce the
opportunity for FCA liability in regulatory violations.  There are nu-
merous reasons to believe that the judicial creation of implied false
certification and the resulting limited FCA liability for regulatory vio-
lations are undesirable outcomes.
A. Implied Certification Lacks Transparency
As a practical matter, judicial decisions incorporating implied cer-
tification lack transparency in explaining why some forms of non-com-
86. See, e.g., United States ex. rel. Mikes v. Straus, 274 F.3d 687, 697 (2d Cir. 2001)
(endorsing false certification doctrine but not addressing materiality require-
ment); Shaw v. AAA Eng’g & Drafting, Inc., 213 F.3d 519, 533 (10th Cir. 2000)
(endorsing false certification doctrine but leaving materiality question open).
87. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Hutcheson v. Blackstone Med., Inc., 647 F.3d 377,
390–92 (1st Cir. 2011); United States v. Sci. Applications Int’l Corp., 626 F.3d
1257, 1269 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (holding broad implied certification liability limited
by materiality of breach).
88. United States ex rel. Thompson v. Columbia/HCA Healthcare Corp., 125 F.3d
899, 902 (5th Cir. 1997) (quoting United States ex rel. Weinberger v. Equifax,
Inc., 557 F.2d 456, 461 (5th Cir. 1977)) (internal quotation marks omitted); see
also SYLVIA, supra note 32, § 4:33; James B. Helmer, Jr. & Julie Webster
Popham, Materiality and the False Claims Act, 71 U. CIN. L. REV. 839 (2003).
89. See United States ex rel. Hendow v. Univ. of Phoenix, 461 F.3d 1166, 1172 (9th
Cir. 2006) (refusing to give “paramount and talismanic significance” to the term
“certification” in part because it does not appear in the text of the FCA).
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pliance are not violations of the FCA.90  The Fifth Circuit has
suggested that implied certification is just a substitute for materiality
analysis.91  In creating parallel doctrines of implied certification and
materiality, however, courts are creating confusing and potentially di-
vergent case law that makes liability less predictable.  The lack of ex-
planatory principles could easily lead other potential defendants to
believe that regulatory compliance simply is not required in certain
circumstances.  Doctrinally, the implied certification doctrine’s focus
upon “conditions of participation” seems like a re-tread of the disfa-
vored “outcome materiality” test.92  Given that most circuits have re-
jected this particular materiality test and that FERA explicitly
described a different materiality standard, the “conditions of partici-
pation” requirement seems to lack justification.
B. Limiting Implied Certification Lacks Statutory and
Legislative Support
Moreover, FCA liability for regulatory violations seems to fit legis-
lative intent, and using false certification to limit liability runs
against that intent.  The legislative history suggests that claims under
the False Claims Act “may take many forms, the most common being a
claim for goods or services not provided, or provided in violation of
contract terms, specification, statute, or regulation.”93  The express
condition of participation requirement also appears contrary to legis-
lative intent, since the legislative history notes that “claims may be
false even though the services are provided as claimed if, for example,
the claimant is ineligible to participate in the program . . . .”94
Unlike courts’ claimed concern of “doubly penalizing” regulatory vi-
olations, the FCA targets falsity and fraud.  Thus, courts should not
solely analyze whether the government would have paid had it known
of the regulatory violation.  Rather, the full counterfactual is whether
the government would have acted differently had it either (1) known
90. See Hutcheson, 647 F.3d at 385–86 (“The text of the FCA does not refer to ‘factu-
ally false’ or ‘legally false’ claims, nor does it refer to ‘express certification’ or
‘implied certification.’  Indeed, it does not refer to ‘certification’ at all.  In light of
this, and our view that these categories may do more to obscure than clarify the
issues before us, we do not employ them here.” (citations omitted)).
91. See Thompson, 125 F.3d at 902 (citing Weinberger, 557 F.2d at 461); see also infra
subsection III.B.4 (discussing materiality).
92. See infra section VII.A; Rabushka ex rel. United States v. Crane Co., 122 F.3d
559, 563 (8th Cir. 1997) (requiring relator to demonstrate that government would
have terminated a pension plan had it known about misrepresentations and
nondisclosures).
93. Shaw v. AAA Eng’g & Drafting, Inc., 213 F.3d 519, 531 (10th Cir. 2000) (quoting
S. REP. NO. 99–345 at 9 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5266, 5274).
94. United States ex rel. Pogue v. Am. Healthcorp, Inc., 914 F. Supp. 1507, 1511
(M.D. Tenn. 1996) (quoting S. REP. NO. 345, at 9 (1986), reprinted in 1986
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5266, 5274) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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of the defendant’s regulatory violations, or (2) known that the defen-
dant lied about regulatory violations.  While a regulatory violation
may have been tangential to the government’s interests, the fact that
a company is willing to be deceptive about violations is core to the
FCA and should have relevance to government decisions.
Finally, failure to find liability also cuts against the core assump-
tion of entities working with federal funds: “Protection of the public
fisc requires that those who seek public funds act with scrupulous re-
gard for the requirements of law . . . .”95  There is little in the statute
or legislative history to suggest that regulatory violations should not
constitute civil FCA liability.
C. Limited FCA Liability Leads to Underenforcement
There are numerous reasons to believe that there is underenforce-
ment of regulatory violations.  Whistleblowers and agencies can sup-
plement enforcement through the False Claims Act, but the false
certification doctrines typically operate to limit civil FCA liability for
cases of regulatory violations.
For a regulatory violation, there exists a direct enforcement mech-
anism: the regulatory agency can pursue administrative or civil ac-
tions against the defendant.  The distinctive aspects of allowing a civil
FCA action are twofold: first, the FCA allows for third parties to be-
come involved in the enforcement process, and second, the FCA pro-
vides for treble damages and per-claim penalties.  I assume here that
a civil FCA action is supplementary in nature: FCA liability is not
displacing or substituting for direct regulatory enforcement.96
I also assume regulations focus primarily on direct benefits of reg-
ulation.97  For example, under Hobbs, I assume that the regulations
requiring radiologist supervision of MRIs are primarily because of reg-
ulator concern for the safety and efficacy of the patients receiving
those MRIs at MedQuest facilities.
1. Low Direct Harm and Constrained Enforcement Resources
For the same reasons that courts are hesitant to assign FCA liabil-
ity (and perhaps explicitly because courts are hesitant to assign liabil-
ity), regulators may not prioritize seeking and correcting technical
95. United States v. Mackby, 261 F.3d 821, 828 (9th Cir. 2001) (quoting Heckler v.
Cmty. Health Servs. of Crawford Cnty., Inc., 467 U.S. 51, 63 (1984)).
96. It is entirely possible that an agency might reduce enforcement efforts knowing
that another agency or whistleblowers have incentives to bring enforcement ac-
tions.  Nonetheless, as discussed below, given that the regulatory violations most
likely to be problematic from an implied certification perspective are probably not
high on the primary agency’s priority list, this substitution effect is unlikely.
97. See discussion infra subsection IV.C.5; there are a variety of reasons to believe
that market competition is not a primary emphasis for regulation.
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violations.  As an organization, a regulatory agency may prioritize de-
tection and prosecution of the most severe offenses with the greatest
immediate, direct harm.98
For both retributive and deterrence rationales, this approach may
make sense for a regulator with limited resources.99  Serious viola-
tions that cause harm deserve sanctions, and society may be better off
if those serious violations can be deterred.  Nonetheless, society could
still be better off if both technical violations and serious violations
were deterred; the resource constraint results in the emphasis on seri-
ous violations.
Even without explicit organizational prioritization of serious of-
fenses, individual regulators likely face incentives to pursue the seri-
ous offenses.  An auditor working for HHS, for example, may find her
career prospects improved if she identifies and pursues serious viola-
tors that have directly caused social harm to the public.  Serious viola-
tions that cause tremendous direct harm will likely attract greater
media and public attention.
2. Costs of Detecting and Sanctioning Non-Compliance
Distinct from the limited resource and prioritization argument
above, the costs of detecting non-compliance and compelling compli-
ance may be too high for the regulator.  Even if the regulator has suffi-
cient resources for detection and investigation, the organization might
apply cost-benefit analysis and determine that the costs of detection
and enforcement outweigh the perceived net direct benefits of
compliance.100
More specifically, compliance with the regulation itself may be so-
cially desirable in that the costs of compliance, born by the regulated
company, are less than the aggregate social benefits provided by regu-
latory compliance.  Because detection and enforcement are costly,
however, a regulator might determine that those regulation costs ex-
ceed the aggregate social benefits provided by compliance.  In the al-
ternative, a regulator might add the regulated company’s compliance
costs with the regulation costs and find that those costs exceed the
aggregate social benefits of compliance.  In either scenario, a regulator
might rationally decide that detection and enforcement are not in soci-
98. See, e.g., DEP’T OF JUSTICE, SMART ON CRIME: REFORMING THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE
SYSTEM FOR THE 21ST CENTURY 2 (2013), archived at http://perma.unl.edu/WF2P-
REKM; DEP’T OF JUSTICE, UNITED STATES ATTORNEYS’ MANUAL § 9-27.230(A)
(1997); DEP’T OF JUSTICE, UNITED STATES ATTORNEYS’ MANUAL § 9-28.300(A) (rev.
ed. 2008).
99. See, e.g., Margaret Lemos & Alex Stein, Strategic Enforcement, 95 MINN. L. REV.
9 (2010).
100. See R.B. COOTER & T. ULEN, LAW & ECONOMICS 510 (5th ed. 2008) (noting that
social planners should minimize social costs, which equal “the sum of the harm
[the offense] causes and the costs of preventing [the offense]”).
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ety’s best interest.  I will refer to this line of analysis as a static cost-
benefit analysis.
To come to such a conclusion, a rational regulator would entertain
certain beliefs.  First, the regulator might believe that deterrence of
non-compliance is not possible or is ineffective.  If deterrence were
possible, the static cost-benefit analysis suggested above might not
come into play if the regulator does not actually incur high detection
and enforcement costs; the threat of detection and enforcement is suf-
ficient to obtain compliance.  Under a rational model of company be-
havior, deterrence might fail for a number of reasons.  First, regulated
companies might not believe in the credibility of the regulator’s threat
to detect and enforce.  There could be lack of credibility in both the
short term and long term, due in part to the uncertainties described
above.  Second, non-compliance might still be rational if the
probability of detection and sanction is sufficiently low and the pen-
alty for doing so is also relatively low.  More precisely, the expected
costs of non-compliance might be sufficiently low that non-compliance
is the rational, amoral choice for the company.
Alternatively, it is possible that a regulator simply does not priori-
tize deterrence and thus adheres to the static cost-benefit analysis.
Deterrence is notoriously difficult to measure, as a regulator must at-
tempt to estimate how much non-compliance there would have been
had she not taken enforcement action.
As a third possibility, it is possible that the regulator believes a
cooperative approach may be a more cost-effective method of manag-
ing the regulated industry.101  Determining liability through conflict
may escalate the transaction costs of determining whether or not
there have been regulatory violations.  Cooperation may be a more de-
sirable model, in which regulators and the regulated entities work to-
gether towards the common goal of minimizing social harms.  For
serious violations that garner broad public attention, cooperative solu-
tions are likely unacceptable politically.  Public pressure for retribu-
tion will force punitive measures against a corporation that, for
example, recklessly poisons customers.  This Article focuses on techni-
cal regulatory violations, though, which are less likely to draw broad
political pressure.
3. Regulatory Capture
A cooperative approach might look similar to the scenario of regu-
latory capture.102  According to capture theory, a regulatory agency
101. See id. at 242–43 (discussing the importance of relationship repair in contract
law).
102. See, e.g., STEVEN P. CROLEY, REGULATION AND PUBLIC INTERESTS: THE POSSIBILITY
OF GOOD REGULATORY GOVERNMENT 26–52 (2008); PREVENTING REGULATORY CAP-
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may come to disregard the public interest and instead become focused
on serving the entities it should be regulating.103  If capture is a possi-
bility, low-level, technical regulatory violations seem to be the best
area for regulators to give in to companies.  These technical violations
will not draw excessive media attention or political opposition.  The
potentially high volume of technical violations makes such concessions
valuable to the regulated companies.
4. Failure to Prioritize Incapaciation
As noted above, regulators might not prioritize deterrence of tech-
nical regulatory violations for a variety of reasons.  I suggest there is a
further, related reason to urge greater emphasis on technical regula-
tory violations: prosecution of such violations may actually lead to an
incapacitation effect, alternatively described as specific deterrence of
the company that is being prosecuted.  This incapacitation might oc-
cur through a number of mechanisms.
First, the technical regulatory violation might be an early step in
the course of a more serious offense.104  For example, detection and
prosecution of a company that is in the process of disposing of a small
amount of waste improperly may prevent that company from continu-
ing in that improper disposal course of action.  If that detection and
prosecution had not occurred in a prompt fashion, the ongoing im-
proper disposal might have gotten worse, to the point where it would
be causing measurable harm to the environment and surrounding
areas.
In a similar fashion, companies that commit technical regulatory
violations may be also prone to committing more serious violations.105
By identifying and prosecuting the technical violation, there is pres-
sure on that type of company to steer clear of more serious violations.
As noted above, regulators’ failure to prioritize such technical regu-
latory violations may simply be due to resource constraints and the
uncertainty of whether such technical regulatory violations actually
TURE: SPECIAL INTEREST INFLUENCE AND HOW TO LIMIT IT (Daniel Carpenter &
David Moss eds., 2013) [hereinafter PREVENTING REGULATORY CAPTURE].
103. See, e.g., Michael A. Livermore & Richard L. Revesz, Regulatory Review, Capture,
and Agency Inaction, 101 GEO. L.J. 1337 (2013); George J. Stigler, The Theory of
Economic Regulation, 2 BELL J. ECON. & MGMT. SCI. 3 (1971).
104. See, e.g., United States v. Christopher, 142 F.3d 46, 55 (1st Cir. 1998) (discussing
the violation of a regulatory order as a potential component of wire fraud); EU-
GENE BARDACH & ROBERT A. KAGAN, GOING BY THE BOOK: THE PROBLEM OF REGU-
LATORY UNREASONABLENESS 266 (2002).
105. See Dorothy Thornton, Neil A. Gunningham & Robert A. Kagan, General Deter-
rence and Corporate Environmental Behavior, 27 LAW & POL’Y 262 (2005)
(describing company strategy of “overcompliance” with regulations to demon-
strate good citizenship).
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lead to worse offenses.106  In a more cynical turn, though, it is also
possible that regulators deliberately avoid pursuing such minor viola-
tions in the hopes that such violations become more serious and thus
beneficial to their careers.
5. Failure to Consider Competitive Harm
Regulators may also underestimate or disregard the harm result-
ing from non-compliance and thus underenforce compliance.  The fact
that only limited companies in an industry may be compliant and thus
incurring greater expenses may not be an important factor for regula-
tors, who may favor taking a case-by-case approach towards each reg-
ulated company.  Moreover, there is good reason to believe that
underenforcement exacerbates the competitive harms from
regulation.
First, regulatory capture seems more likely with the power of a
larger, more established company.107  Smaller companies are less
likely to have surplus resources to invest in government affairs.
Second, on an individual basis, individual regulators may also
favor lax enforcement with larger companies in the anticipation of a
comfortable private-sector job after leaving government service.108
Again, smaller companies are less likely to have the infrastructure
and capacity to absorb such additional labor.
Third, government officials in charge of an awarded contract are
likely to treat technical regulatory violations as “immaterial.”  A gov-
ernment official may have a variety of justifications for awarding a
contract to a large company; the decision may be overdetermined.
Upon discovery of some technical regulatory violations, it may be easy
ex post to continue justifying the award of the contract.  Effectively,
the official tells himself that the large company would have been
awarded the contract anyway, even if he had ex ante known about
technical regulatory violations.  Because public awareness of addi-
tional, previously undisclosed regulatory violations do not all occur at
one point in time, the official can continue to claim that each newly
discovered regulatory violation is immaterial, even though in aggre-
gate those violations might have been sufficient to award the contract
to another party.
106. See Factors in Decisions on Criminal Prosecutions for Environmental Violations,
DEP’T OF JUSTICE (July 1, 1991), http://www.justice.gov/enrd/selected-publica
tions/factors-decisions-criminal-prosecutions, archived at http://perma.unl.edu/8Z
FQ-UJX5 (explaining factors to be considered when determining whether to
prosecute).
107. See Luigi Zingales, Preventing Economists’ Capture, in PREVENTING REGULATORY
CAPTURE, supra note 102, at 124, 144.
108. See id.
2015] FAIR COMPETITION THEORY 375
Fourth, government officials in an “external” regulatory sphere are
also likely to disregard competitive harm in the decision to enforce a
regulation.  For example, a defense contractor might violate an OSHA
regulation that is incorporated by a generalized statement of compli-
ance in the DoD contract.  As an independent decision maker, OSHA
is likely to look solely at the direct costs and benefits of pursuing en-
forcement action against the defense contractor.  OSHA is unlikely to
consider what impact regulatory enforcement would have upon the
competitive marketplace for defense contractors; OSHA’s more rele-
vant frame of reference is all companies that fall within the regula-
tions’ sphere.
Finally, there are reasons to believe that regulators may be more
likely to pursue a cooperative or non-aggressive enforcement approach
with larger companies.109  Since cooperation is ostensibly less costly
than a conflict-centric litigation approach and larger companies tend
to have longer track records and a longer ongoing relationship with
the regulator, cooperative enforcement may appear more attractive
with the larger companies.  Regulators may find it difficult to estab-
lish trusting, cooperative relationships with smaller companies and
their shorter track records.  This may be a legitimate investment on
behalf of the regulator, but it may also be evidence of a sunk cost fal-
lacy regarding past investment in the large company.  It is possible
that a cooperative approach may foster greater compliance, but it may
also foster weaker compliance if the larger company can simply
demonstrate “good faith” efforts to improve.
The combination of these factors suggests that there may be harms
to the competitive marketplace resulting from regulatory enforce-
ment.  Regulations may inherently favor certain companies, and un-
derenforcement of regulations may exacerbate the problem.  In the
short term, certain competitors may bear the burden of this competi-
tive harm.  The companies that comply with regulations face higher
costs and are potentially less competitive than their non-compliant
counterparts.  In the longer term, the public and the government may
bear the competitive marketplace harm; if the non-compliant compa-
nies come to dominate the marketplace, there may be no compliant
alternatives for government contracts.
As a result, regulatory violations are likely underenforced by regu-
lators.  Therefore, broad liability for regulatory violations under the
FCA is a desirable supplement to direct enforcement.
109. See generally Peter C. Yeager, Structural Bias in Regulatory Law Enforcement:
The Case of the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, 23 SOC. PROBS. 330, 333
(1987).
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D. Unnecessary Risks for Whistleblowers
Unpredictable liability for regulatory violations under the FCA
also produces unnecessary risks for whistleblowers.  Whistleblowers
face a variety of risks upon choosing to expose wrongdoing by their
employer.  A whistleblower may be fired or face other negative career
consequences from her decision to blow the whistle, including being
blackballed by the industry.110  She may also encounter social conse-
quences, such as the disfavor of colleagues and supervisors, for her
actions.111  There may also be financial consequences beyond employ-
ment, as the revealed wrongdoing may result in the downfall of her
employer and perhaps the loss of her retirement funding.
The unprincipled, unclear false certification doctrine further exac-
erbates the risks for whistleblowers.  A potential whistleblower faces
additional uncertainty in revealing clear regulatory violations: will a
court even recognize and compensate her for her efforts?  It is under-
standable if such uncertainty discourages whistleblower participation
in a larger sense; will a whistleblower know when fraud constitutes a
regulatory violation as opposed to a more “serious” violation that
courts are likely to recognize?
V. PROPOSAL: THE FAIR COMPETITION THEORY
OF THE FCA
A. An Instrumental View of Hobbs
Let us return to Hobbs for a moment.  The Sixth Circuit did not
specify precisely why it felt the FCA was too “blunt” of an instrument
to be applied to the knowingly incorrect specification of supervising
physicians; its analysis focused on the false certification doctrines de-
scribed above.112  If we take a more instrumental view of Hobbs, it is
possible that the court was looking to serve society’s general interests
through cost-benefit analysis—do the benefits of allowing FCA liabil-
ity exceed the costs of doing so?  One basic unstated motivation may
have been the lack of allegations of actual harm occurring to patients
due to the qualifications of the supervising physicians.  The court
might have felt that assessing any civil monetary sanction was exces-
sively punitive without a method of quantifying any societal harm in
the form of injured or misdiagnosed patients.
110. See, e.g., Jessica R. Mesmer-Magnus & Chockalingam Viswesvaran, Whistleblow-
ing in Organizations: An Examination of Correlates of Whistleblowing Intentions,
Actions, and Retaliation, 62 J. BUS. ETHICS 277, 281–82 (2005).
111. Id. at 281.
112. As discussed infra in Part VI, the lack of transparency in the underlying logic of
FCA liability raises a number of problems, including the challenge of predicting
judicial decisions regarding liability.
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More generally, the court may have been evaluating the costs and
benefits of applying FCA liability to the facts of Hobbs.  Let us assume
there was cost-benefit analysis justifying the general principle that
labs must have a named radiologist supervise the technicians con-
ducting the MRIs.  This analysis ostensibly incorporated the addi-
tional risk of harm or error that might result from the average
unsupervised technician conducting the MRI.  When weighed against
the cost of paying a supervising radiologist, the additional labor cost
ostensibly was less than the expected harm from the unsupervised
technician.
The Sixth Circuit thus may have been suggesting that the specific
facts of Hobbs did not satisfy cost-benefit analysis.  Perhaps the lack
of error or harm suggests that the actual supervising physicians,
while not radiologists by training, were sufficiently skilled in supervi-
sion such that there was no real increase in the comparative expected
harm.  Alternatively, perhaps the technicians employed by MedQuest
were sufficiently skilled such that supervision by radiologists would
not have improved their performance.
Another parallel possibility is that, regardless of whether the facts
of Hobbs satisfied cost-benefit analysis, incorporation of civil FCA lia-
bility would be excessive in comparison to the harm caused by claim-
ing the wrong supervising physicians.  It is possible the court did not
value the potential deterrence generated by higher civil sanctions
available via the FCA, or that the court did not want judicial resources
involved in such cases.
The larger problem, though, is that even if some form of cost-bene-
fit analysis justified the lack of liability in Hobbs, the court was not
transparent in the decision.  As discussed earlier, there is little reason
to believe false certification doctrines are well directed toward social
goals.  MedQuest, competitors, and future competitors may draw the
wrong conclusions from the Hobbs decision.  For example, they might
infer that compliance with certain regulations is unimportant and not
worth substantial investment.  Whistleblowers would certainly draw
the conclusion that authorities were uninterested in learning about
allegations of improper physician supervision.
Worse yet, there may be a real impact in the marketplace due to
MedQuest’s violations.  Compliance is costly.  Permitting such techni-
cal violations by entities that are capable of minimizing the risk of
these technical violations gives those entities a competitive advan-
tage.  In Hobbs, MedQuest gained a competitive advantage by using
non-radiologist physicians to supervise contrast MRI and CT scans.
Radiologists are among the highest compensated subspecialist physi-
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cians, earning twice as much as a family physician.113  Other diagnos-
tic testing organizations, presumably following the law, would have
double the supervisory labor costs of the MedQuest labs.  Without the
participation of the whistleblower in Hobbs, it is unclear if and when
the federal government would have discovered the regulatory
violations.
B. A Fair Competition Approach to the FCA
While theoretically desirable, the reality is that courts would likely
perceive the express cost-benefit analysis discussed above as costly
and ill-suited for judicial analysis; such analysis is better performed
by the regulating or enforcement agencies.  As discussed in Part IV,
however, existing false certification doctrines present many problems.
Courts can improve by rejecting existing implied certification doc-
trine and instead adopting a fair competition approach to the statute.
Fundamentally, when dealing with an FCA case premised on clear
regulatory violations, courts should operate with the presumption
that regulatory compliance satisfies cost-benefit analysis.  Given that
the DOJ can control whether FCA cases proceed or not, courts can rely
on Executive Branch oversight to determine whether asserting liabil-
ity is in society’s best interest.  Through this presumption, courts can
focus on their comparative strength: identifying clear regulatory viola-
tions and the attendant mens rea.114  Stated another way, the default
assumption for an undisclosed and clear regulatory violation is civil
FCA liability.  Under this approach, the only difference between pre-
and post-contract formation liability under the FCA is the mens rea
timeframe—pre-contract formation liability looks at mens rea at the
time of contract agreement, while post-contract formation liability
looks at mens rea at the time of invoicing or payment.
This assumption makes sense within the purposes and framework
of the FCA.  Rather than focusing solely on punishing fraud and the
elements of deceit and loss, I suggest that the FCA is also cognizant of
fair competition in the marketplace.  By relying upon companies in the
private marketplace, the federal government obtains benefits that
would be more costly to provide if it were to produce those goods or
services alone.  Rather than building data centers itself, the federal
government issues procurement contracts to allow private businesses
to build those data centers at comparative lower cost.
113. See Leslie Kane & Carol Pekham, Medscape Physician Compensation Report
2014, MEDSCAPE MULTISPECIALITY (Apr. 15, 2014), http://www.medscape.com/fea
tures/slideshow/compensation/2014/public/overview, archived at http://perma.unl
.edu/49Z7-5WB3?type=live.
114. As noted in the statute, FCA liability requires a “knowing” mens rea. See supra
note 13 and accompanying text.  The fair competition approach to the FCA does
not affect the mens rea requirement; this is not a proposal for strict liability.
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Fair competition is key to making this system work.  If a private
business can obtain a government contract without competition, the
government may not enjoy any comparative cost savings.  In the same
way, a private business that violates government regulations may ob-
tain an advantage over competitors because compliance with regula-
tions is costly, and a non-compliant business would have lower costs.
Those illegitimately lower costs might allow a non-compliant business
to offer goods or services to the government at a price that compliant
business could not match.  In the long run, not only do the compliant
businesses lose out, but the government loses out, too, as it may end
up with marketplace of only non-compliant businesses.
1. Cost of Compliance as a Sanction
Courts may have difficulty in precisely calculating the level of com-
petitive harm and thus the relevant sanction.  One basic first step in
addressing the level of harm is to calculate the cost of compliance.
Courts can look at the cost of compliance as a rough low-end measure
of the benefit gained by the non-compliant company.  Given that the
non-compliant company knowingly failed to comply, logic suggests
that a rational company would choose to do so only if it believed the
expected gains from non-compliance exceeded the cost of compliance.
Thus, the cost of compliance can be a low-end estimate for the ex-
pected benefit enjoyed by the defendant.115  The key first step for
courts, then, is to apply a sanction at least as high as the cost of com-
pliance.  A defendant who commits a technical violation should pay
civil sanctions that would be at least equivalent to the cost of the de-
fendant having properly implemented a control system that would
have caught such a technical violation.
This proposal thus avoids the problem of focusing excessively on
the difficult question of determining the precise level of harm to the
government.  Focusing on fair competition also addresses the secon-
dary concern that may underlie courts’ reluctance to incorporate civil
liability for technical regulatory violations: that the weight of fraud
sanctions exceeds the harm from the violation.  As noted above, the
fair competition assumption gives courts a method of estimating at
least the defendant’s gain from the violation.  Rather than viewing the
sanction as punitive, though, courts may view FCA liability as analo-
gous to disgorgement.  The defendant gained some benefit from the
regulatory violation, and the defendant should at least pay back that
115. In theory, the proper sanction should equal the total harm caused by the non-
compliance; as noted above, such calculation is likely difficult and better per-
formed by a specialized agency.  Nonetheless, the treble damages provision of the
FCA, along with the per-claim sanctions, may provide additional leverage to
move in the proper direction of full harm.
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gain.  By emphasizing this civil disgorgement aspect, courts can move
away from the stigmatic claims of labeling the behavior as fraud.
While using competition as a guideline for FCA liability will im-
prove the current analysis, it is important to distinguish this approach
from one that explicitly embraces greater market competition as a
guideline for FCA liability.  It is entirely possible that greater regula-
tory enforcement might lead to reduced market competition; I discuss
this possibility in section VII.F.  Nonetheless, I argue that fair compe-
tition is a step in the right direction, and the focus on compliance costs
is an area that courts have comparative advantages in addressing.
Comparatively, assessing actual greater market competition is an
area better handled by Congress and expert agencies.  Agencies will
have every opportunity to weigh in on cases that do not actually im-
prove market competition through the procedures of the FCA.
Also note that this proposal does not accurately reflect true dis-
gorgement.  Fair competition would require full disgorgement for im-
proper profits, but such calculation is difficult.  From a disgorgement
perspective, low-compliance providers may gain improper profit and
may secure government business as a result of their low-compliance
advantages.  Alternatively, though, those low-compliance providers
may not be gaining any additional profit in comparison to a high-com-
pliance provider because their avoided costs of compliance are trans-
ferred to the government in the form of a lower bid.  There still may be
difficult-to-measure benefits accruing to the low-compliance provider
in its ongoing business: the fact that it obtained government business
may have reputational benefits and may ease the process of obtaining
future business.
This proposal also does not claim to be a precise calculation of ac-
tual harm to the government.  As noted above, in the short term, it is
possible that the government gained the “benefit” of the non-compli-
ance; a company may have saved money by not complying and passed
along those savings to the government in the form of a lower bid.  In
the longer term, estimating the changes to the marketplace as a result
of technical regulatory violations will be a costly and imprecise
endeavor.
Providing civil liability based on the cost of compliance is a rough
proxy for fair competition.  In summary, this fair competition frame-
work proposes setting aside existing false certification doctrines for
clear regulatory violations.  In other words, all requests for payment
implicitly certify compliance with applicable rules and regulations.  If
the defendant was aware of clear non-compliance and submitted a re-
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quest for payment without disclosing the non-compliance,116 the de-
fendant should be civilly liable under the FCA.
2. Limited Defenses Regarding No Competitive Harm
As part of the court’s limited role in analyzing competitive harm,
there should be very limited means by which a defendant could affirm-
atively defend against the presumption of competitive harm.
a. Competitive Market with No One in Compliance
First, the presumption of competitive harm may be overcome if the
defendant can demonstrate that there is a thick competitive market in
which all competitors routinely forgo compliance with the relevant
regulations and none of the competitors face sanctions for their non-
compliance.  These conditions present a situation where seemingly
everyone agrees that compliance is not required and is apparently un-
important.  If a defendant can establish this, there is no reason to ap-
ply civil liability under the FCA.
Of course, direct regulatory action by the relevant agency is still an
enforcement possibility, and to the extent that agency wishes to begin
enforcement efforts in a fully non-compliant industry, direct regula-
tory action makes sense as a first step.  Courts should be wary of too
quickly applying civil FCA liability to other companies after an agency
has first “made an example” of one non-compliant company in a histor-
ically non-compliant industry.
b. De Minimis
Second, a defendant could potentially defend an FCA claim
through de minimis analysis, arguing that the regulatory violation is
too minor for the courts to consider.  I suggest that the relevant dollar
amount is the civil penalty minimum, presently at $5,500.117  Thus, if
compliance with the regulation would have cost an order of magnitude
under $5,500, then the violation might be de minimis and not subject
to FCA liability.
Note, though, that the cost of regulatory compliance is only a low-
end estimate of the harm to competition.  It is entirely possible that
low-cost regulatory violations could result in substantial competitive
advantages that should still lead to civil FCA liability.  For example,
assuming that bribery is at least a regulatory violation, the fact that a
decision maker was swayed by a low $50 bribe or dinner outing should
116. Note that disclosure of non-compliance alone may not remove the potential for
civil FCA liability.  See infra subsection V.B.2.c for a discussion on government
knowledge.
117. The minimum civil penalty may be a rough estimate of legislative intent regard-
ing de minimis violations.
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not automatically establish that the violation was de minimis, espe-
cially if the resulting contract or award is of substantially higher
value.
c. Government Knowledge
A common existing defense against FCA charges is that a govern-
ment agent knew, or even condoned the defendant’s behavior.  The ar-
gument is that since a government agent knew what was going on,
there can be no fraud or deception.118
If the government knows and approves of the particulars of a claim for pay-
ment before that claim is presented, the presenter cannot be said to have
knowingly presented a fraudulent or false claim.  In such a case, the govern-
ment’s knowledge effectively negates the fraud or falsity required by the
FCA.119
Stated another way, if the defendant believed the government ap-
proved of the defendant’s actions, the defendant lacked the mens rea
for an FCA violation.  At least one court has rejected this as a broad
defense, though, noting that a government agent who had knowledge
of the behavior might simply be a co-conspirator in defrauding the fed-
eral government.120
This government knowledge problem parallels the materiality con-
cern: if the government knows about a violation, either pre- or post-
contract formation, a defendant could similarly argue that the viola-
tion was not material to the government’s decision to award a contract
or to pay subsequent invoices.121
Adopting an approach to FCA liability emphasizing fair competi-
tion suggests that a government agent’s knowledge alone should not
be a defense; just because a government agent had an understanding
with one particular entity does not mean that there was fair competi-
tion.  Rather, competitors must also know that the government knows
and condones such behavior.  If competitors do not know they may ex-
118. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Becker v. Westinghouse Savannah River Co., 305
F.3d 284, 289 (4th Cir. 2002); Shaw v. AAA Eng’g & Drafting, Inc., 213 F.3d 519,
534 (10th Cir. 2000); United States ex rel. Kreindler & Kreindler v. United Techs.
Corp., 985 F.2d 1148, 1157 (2d Cir. 1993); United States ex rel. Hagood v. Sonoma
Cnty. Water Agency, 929 F.2d 1416, 1421 (9th Cir. 1991); see also SYLVIA, supra
note 32, at § 4:42 (discussing the relevance of government knowledge as a defense
to liability under the False Claims Act).
119. United States ex rel. Durcholz v. FKW, Inc., 189 F.3d 542, 545 (7th Cir. 1999).
120. United States ex rel. Asch v. Teller, Levit & Silvertrust, P.C., No. 00 C 3289, 2004
WL 1093784 at *3 (N.D. Ill. May 7, 2004) (“[K]nowledge and even acquiescence on
the part of a government employee is not a defense to a false claims Act [sic] case
because, if that were so, a contractor in cahoots with a government official would
be insulated from a false claims Act [sic] suit.”).
121. See United States v. Intervest Corp., 67 F. Supp. 2d 637 (S.D. Miss. 1999) (find-
ing the government’s continued payment while knowing about false certification
demonstrated that the certification was not material).
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ercise excessive care in following contracts, rules, or regulations, thus
resulting in less profitability and the possibility that they exit the
market for government services.
Explicitly demonstrating competitor knowledge is difficult, as
courts would have to address questions regarding which entities count
as competitors and what percentage of competitors would have to
know of the government’s position.  Instead, establishing this defense
should simply require clear government disclosure of the understand-
ing.  Thus, closely-held information by a single government agent
would be insufficient to establish a defense against FCA liability.  In
particular, the clear public disclosure by the government must be ex
ante, occurring before entities have a chance to bid or participate in
the government process.
Relatedly, a government agent may obtain knowledge of the non-
compliance because of direct disclosure by the defendant at the time of
invoicing in an attempt to avoid FCA liability.  For liability to not at-
tach, though, it is important that there is also some corrective action
or sanction for the non-compliance.
3. Defenses that Courts Should Not Consider
a. Actual Market Competitiveness
To be clear, this proposal explicitly rejects detailed judicial analy-
sis regarding actual market competition.  For instance, the market for
a product or services to the government in some areas may not actu-
ally have competition.  For the most part, this concern may be amelio-
rated by the existence of potential competitors; the fact that there may
be no actual direct competitor at a certain point in time should not
diminish the importance of ensuring a fair competitive market.  I sug-
gest that this form of analysis should not be considered by the court;
the DOJ and contracting agency are better suited for this form of
analysis.
Similarly, this proposal rejects analysis of conditions in which po-
tential competition is unlikely or undesirable.  First, there may be
natural monopolies or other structural reasons for a lack of competi-
tion during an extended timeframe.  For example, a geographically re-
mote area may only be able to support a single Medicare provider, and
a combination of personal connections in that remote area may make
it unreasonable to expect competition.  Another example would be
non-competitive situations that the government actually desires.  The
government might believe that a particular monopolistic entity is in
the best interests of society, or the government might desire no compe-
tition for reasons related to government capture.
Again, because the government has unilateral control over FCA
cases through its intervention process, this is not an area that re-
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quires judicial intervention.  If the government desires information re-
garding the non-compliance of monopolists, it can do so by pursuing
such cases.  If it deems these cases improper, it can shut down these
causes of action.  There is no need for courts to single out these areas
for exception.
b. Lack of Gains or Payment
This proposal also rejects detailed judicial analysis of the defen-
dant’s gains or lack thereof from the non-compliance.  A defendant
might claim, for example, that any additional profits gained from non-
compliance were actually passed along to the government as cost sav-
ings.  Courts should not recognize this line of argument; if such cost
savings are to be legitimate considerations, they must be publicly ac-
knowledged ex ante.
Another variant is if the defendant does not even get paid by the
government; I suggest that this should not be a consideration for
courts.  Courts have discussed whether FCA liability should attach
when the government does not actually pay on a false claim.122  A de-
fendant might argue that since the government did not make a pay-
ment, the government did not suffer harm.  Under the principle of fair
competition, I suggest that FCA liability should attach.  As discussed
earlier, the fact that a company is non-compliant may allow it to offer
lower prices or other incentives.  Compliant competitors may observe
such pricing and unnecessarily expend greater costs trying to deter-
mine how that company could be legitimately achieving such prices.
Harm to fair competition has already occurred when the non-compli-
ant company attempts to obtain government business; the fact that
the government had not paid should not play a role in determining
liability.123
C. Two Alternatives to the Fair Competition Proposal
If courts are reluctant to adopt the above fair competition proposal
that generally leads to civil FCA liability for regulatory violations, I
suggest two potentially more palatable alternatives to the existing
false certification framework.
1. Judicial Deference for Intervened Cases
If courts are reluctant to broadly allow civil liability for technical
violations, I argue that courts should at least do so in intervened
cases.  In Hobbs, the DOJ intervened in the private litigation and thus
led the litigation process; this is a strong signal of the government’s
122. For a summary of various arguments, see SYLVIA supra note 33, at § 4:52.
123. An alternative view of the non-payment scenario is looking at the behavior as
attempted fraud.
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interest in the private party’s case.124  The appellate court nonethe-
less overturned the case.  The court described FCA liability as inap-
propriate as a policy matter, but the underlying logic is not entirely
clear.  Note that the court distinguished the specific bodies making
regulatory decisions.125  Is the court concerned about HHS or CMS
overriding the proper role of the local CMS-authorized provider?
This is unusual.  If this were a conflict between separate branches
of government (Executive vs. Legislative), perhaps a more active role
for the courts is justified.  It is entirely possible that different person-
nel and entities might disagree about the proper sanctions for the im-
proper supervision at play in Hobbs.  For example, it is possible that
CMS, the Inspector General of HHS, and the DOJ all differed as to the
level of civil sanctions they believed appropriate in Hobbs.  Nonethe-
less, those parties are not independently represented in court, and it is
unclear how the court would be well suited towards addressing such a
conflict.
Courts that are hesitant to embrace broad civil liability for techni-
cal violations could at least rely on DOJ intervention as a signal that
there is sufficient Executive agreement that litigation is important.  If
courts believe that the DOJ is failing in its duty to dismiss cases, they
can apply more stringent oversight to non-intervened cases through
cost-benefit analysis as described below, while allowing broad civil lia-
bility for intervened cases.
This alternative is inferior to the broad fair competition approach,
though, as it increases the ease by which the DOJ or particular agen-
cies might act in anti-competitive fashion while seeming neutral.
Most non-intervened cases are unsuccessful, but the reasons for the
lack of success are unclear.  Forcing the DOJ and the corresponding
agencies to dismiss cases rather than letting them languish will be a
strong statement about either the lack of merits or the importance of
the named defendant.  Allowing cases to proceed on a non-intervened
basis supports the overall goal of the FCA by allowing privately liti-
gated cases to proceed when the DOJ has insufficient resources to
handle all legitimate cases.
2. Express Adoption of Cost-Benefit Analysis
If courts are reluctant to delegate detailed analysis to the DOJ and
agencies as suggested above, they could still improve over the existing
false certification scheme by explicitly embracing cost-benefit analysis
in determining whether FCA liability should apply.  Such transparent
reasoning would help agencies craft better contracts and regulations
124. See United States ex rel. Hobbs v. MedQuest Assocs., Inc., 711 F.3d 707, 710 (6th
Cir. 2013).
125. Id. at 710–11.
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rather than focus on false certification doctrines.  As this Article sug-
gests, competitive harms should be part of the cost-benefit analysis
adopted by courts.  There are variations to the rule, however.  For ex-
ample, courts might say that the regulation itself must satisfy cost-
benefit analysis.  Alternatively, the regulation might have to satisfy
cost-benefit analysis as applied to the specific defendant.  Another al-
ternative might be to indicate that litigation costs must be factored
into the analysis: FCA actions are acceptable only if the benefits ex-
ceed the costs of both the regulation itself and of enforcement
litigation.
One basic example that courts might adopt to simplify the cost-
benefit analysis process is simply to state that if any regulated entity
actually complies with the technical regulation at play, that is suffi-
cient to establish that cost-benefit analysis supports the regulation.
Thus, all the DOJ must demonstrate is that there is a compliant en-
tity in existence.
VI. FAIR COMPETITION’S SUPERIORITY
OVER THE STATUS QUO
A. Transparency and Predictability
This fair competition proposal offers a clear default rule: the pre-
sumption of regulatory compliance.  If a company invoices the govern-
ment, courts and the government can assume compliance with all
regulations.  To overcome this presumption, the government must ex-
pressly waive a compliance requirement or a contractor must ex-
pressly disclose non-compliance at the time of invoicing.
The fair competition framework is transparent regarding its aims
and is fair to the participating parties.  If a company participates in a
government contract, it will be held liable if it knowingly violates a
rule or regulation as part of the contract.  Companies can be confident
that the same rules apply to all companies within the regulated indus-
try, and they can all compete fairly for government business.  Instead
of facing the uncertainty of false certification doctrine, with its focus
on particular words that may or may not appear in subsequent invoic-
ing, companies should be on notice at the time of contract that they
may face civil liability for regulatory violations.
Similarly, whistleblowers, who have contributed greatly to the en-
forcement of the FCA, will enjoy greater predictability in their deci-
sion to blow the whistle.  Whistleblowers face enormous career risks
in choosing to file FCA actions; clear regulatory violations should fall
within the ambit of their concerns.  This straightforward default pre-
sumption will improve whistleblower confidence in the judicial
process.
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B. Closer to Statutory and Legislative Intent
As previously discussed, civil liability for regulatory violations
seems to follow both the text of the statute and its legislative history.
The legislative history suggests that claims under the False Claims
Act “may take many forms, the most common being a claim for goods
or services not provided, or provided in violation of contract terms,
specification, statute, or regulation.”126  Moreover, “claims may be
false even though the services are provided as claimed if, for example,
the claimant is ineligible to participate in the program . . . .”127
Liability for knowing, clear regulatory violations also fits with the
core expectation of entities working with federal funds: “Protection of
the public fisc requires that those who seek public funds act with
scrupulous regard for the requirements of law . . . .”128
Finally, the fair competition framework reflects the two distinct
claims addressed by the FCA.  The statute proscribes “false or fraudu-
lent” claims against the federal government.129  “False” and “fraudu-
lent” are not synonymous; a fraudulent claim incorporates both deceit
and loss to the victim.130  I argue that the explicit inclusion of both
false claims and fraudulent claims in the statute demonstrates legisla-
tive awareness of the potential difficulties in calculating precise losses
attributable to deceptive claims.  Including liability for false claims in
addition to fraudulent claims suggests that Congress wanted the flexi-
bility to pursue cases in which government losses were attenuated or
unclear.  This broader conception should easily incorporate the atten-
uated harms due to unfair competition through regulatory non-
compliance.
126. Shaw v. AAA Eng’g & Drafting, Inc., 213 F.3d 519, 531 (10th Cir. 2000) (quoting
S. REP. NO. 99–345, at 9 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. §§ 5266, 5274)
(internal quotation marks omitted).
127. United States ex rel. Pogue v. Am. Healthcorp, Inc., 914 F. Supp. 1507, 1511
(M.D. Tenn. 1996) (citing S. REP. NO. 99-345, at 9).
128. United States v. Mackby, 261 F.3d 821, 828 (9th Cir. 2001) (quoting Heckler v.
Cmty. Health Servs. of Crawford Cnty., Inc., 467 U.S. 51, 63 (1984)) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
129. 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(1) (2012).
130. Like many other federal fraud statutes, the FCA fails to explicitly define fraud.
See Ellen S. Podgor, Criminal Fraud, 48 AM. U. L. REV. 729, 736–40 (1999), for a
review of federal fraud statutes and the definition of fraud. See also JAMES
FITZJAMES STEPHEN, 2 A HISTORY OF THE CRIMINAL LAW OF ENGLAND 121–22
(1883) (“I shall not attempt to construct a definition which will meet every case
which might be suggested, but there is little danger in saying that whenever the
words ‘fraud’ or ‘intent to defraud’ or ‘fraudulently’ occur in the definition of a
crime two elements at least are essential to the commission of the crime: namely,
first, deceit or an intention to deceive or in some cases mere secrecy; and sec-
ondly, either actual injury or possible injury or an intent to expose some person
either to actual injury or to a risk of possible injury by means of that deceit or
secrecy.”).
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C. Improved Regulatory Enforcement
Providing straightforward civil FCA liability for clear regulatory
violations will help mitigate the problem of regulatory underenforce-
ment.131  First, FCA liability will increase the resources available for
the prosecution of such offenses.132  Law firms, whistleblowers, and
competitors have direct incentive to invest in discovering and prose-
cuting regulatory violations.  As demonstrated by the explosive
growth in FCA actions, the private sector has been eager to partici-
pate since the 1986 amendments to the FCA removed barriers to pri-
vate compensation.133
Second, FCA liability will improve the efficiency of detecting such
offenses through the efforts of whistleblowers who are better situated
to detect violations in comparison to government efforts.134  Govern-
ment oversight of technical regulatory compliance is costly, as it in-
volves additional manpower and infrastructure.  In comparison,
whistleblowers are already embedded in a company’s organizational
structure, and they already have expertise in the relevant industry.
Discovery of regulatory violations may be much less costly for the
whistleblower.135
Third, FCA liability will better align incentives to improve deter-
rence: as noted above, it offers greater resources for enforcement, and
it adds per-claim penalties that can increase sanctions.136  FCA liabil-
ity ensures that defendants who knowingly violate regulations have
every incentive to disclose and correct those violations.
Fourth, the FCA is well positioned to recognize and prosecute the
problem of competitive harms derived from regulatory regimes.  Un-
like the general discussion above regarding private enforcement, this
focus on fair competition is distinctive to the FCA and I explore it in
more detail here.
131. I discuss the problem of regulatory underenforcement in section IV.C.  See Mat-
thew C. Stephenson, Public Regulation of Private Enforcement: The Case for Ex-
panding the Role of Administrative Agencies, 91 VA. L. REV. 93, 107 (2005) for a
summary of the general benefits of private enforcement.
132. See id. at 107–08.
133. See Dep’t of Justice Press Release, supra note 1.
134. See Stephenson, supra note 131, at 108.
135. Of course, while discovery of violations may be low cost to the whistleblower, re-
vealing those violations to an external authority may be very costly to the
whistleblower depending on the availability of secrecy and whistleblower protec-
tions. See Mesmer-Magnus & Viswesvaran, supra note 110.
136. Greater expected sanctions may result in deterrence of potential offenders who
weigh expected sanctions against the gains of regulatory violations. See ROBERT
COOTER & THOMAS ULEN, LAW & ECONOMICS 494–99 (5th ed. 2007).
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1. Private Enforcers Care About Competitive Markets
Private enforcement under the FCA may originate from a variety
of parties.  Sometimes companies identify wrongdoing within other
companies and bring FCA actions.137  Many actions are by internal
whistleblowers—employees or former employees of a company who
identify wrongdoing by their employer.  These are all parties that
have an interest in a fair, competitive marketplace.  Companies do not
want other companies gaining an unfair competitive advantage by
profiting through regulatory violations.  Losing out on government
contracts because of unfair competitive advantages causes real harm
to the competitors.138  Relying on the private marketplace to supply
technical regulatory compliance may simply offer an opportunity for
those individuals most harmed to supply the enforcement that regula-
tors may be unlikely to perform.
Given the generally poor treatment of whistleblowers by their em-
ployers, it is also understandable that whistleblowers have an interest
in a fair, competitive marketplace, too.  Whistleblowers will likely find
their careers limited at their present employer.  They may alterna-
tively find that they must resort to litigation or threats of litigation to
protect their careers.  To the extent that there are competitors to their
employer, those competitors may provide outside employment options
for the whistleblowers and thus some insurance in the event of ad-
verse employment actions by their present employer.139
2. The Contracting Agency Has Some Comparative Concern for
Competitive Markets
When an external agency is responsible for enforcing the underly-
ing regulation, the contracting agency likely has more immediate con-
cern for competitive markets.  The DoD has more interest than OSHA
in ensuring that there is a competitive market for weapons manufac-
turing.  Thus, OSHA may be less willing to expend resources on a
technical safety violation at a military manufacturer, while the DoD
may be more willing.  Giving the contracting agency slightly more lev-
erage by providing a cause of civil action under the FCA may help
137. See, e.g., In re Pharm. Indus. Average Wholesale Price Litig., 491 F. Supp. 2d 12
(D. Mass. 2007) (discussing a pharmacy identifying wrongdoing by medical
manufacturer).
138. See, e.g., Zechariah Chafee, Jr., Unfair Competition, 53 HARV. L. REV. 1289, 1303
(1940).
139. There has been speculation that this factor explains the tremendous growth of
whistleblower activity in healthcare fraud compared to the slow growth in de-
fense industry fraud.  There is comparatively little competition in the American
defense industry, while there are numerous healthcare providers.  A healthcare
worker is thus more likely to be able to find alternative employment and is less
easily blackballed.
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mitigate some underenforcement tendencies by the external regula-
tory agency.
Failure to comply allows unmerited profit; competitors who prop-
erly implement compliance systems are at a disadvantage in compari-
son.  Civil sanctions are necessary to maintain competitive balance;
otherwise, in the long run, the government will lose out because of the
comparative success of these low-compliance entities.  Over time, the
low-compliance entities will be more profitable and thus dominate the
market, leaving the contracting agency with no high-compliance
providers.
In a less cynical turn, regulators may actually desire enforcement
by a separate agency.  To the extent a regulator desires compliance
but finds herself in a difficult situation due to competing pressures
within an agency, allowing another agency or a third party to pursue
enforcement may be a desirable alternative.
As this last point suggests, I recognize the possibility that agency
capture may complicate this comparative analysis.  Nonetheless, as
noted in subsection IV.C.3 above, should agency capture exist, it will
likely tend towards regulatory underenforcement.  As suggested ear-
lier, courts are ill-suited in managing such inter-agency disputes in
the context of an FCA action; permitting civil FCA liability places the
burden on the agencies to resolve their disputes.140
3. Fair, Competitive Markets Are Part of the Underlying
Premise of the FCA
The two key principles driving the FCA are (1) protecting the pub-
lic fisc, and (2) engaging private third parties.141  The general premise
in allowing qui tam actions is reliance on the “market” of private par-
ties to detect and sanction fraud.  Thus, in a symmetrical design, the
government contracts with the private market for various goods and
services, and it also relies on the private market to protect those con-
tracts against falsity and fraud.  In the context of technical regulatory
violations, these principles translate into one key objective for the
FCA: fair competition in the marketplace.  This objective will gener-
ally lead to liability under the FCA for one main reason: compliance
with regulations is costly.  Without consistent civil liability for non-
compliance, a non-compliant contractor may obtain a competitive ad-
vantage over those who do pay for compliance.  In the long run, failure
to assess civil liability may result in a market that consists only of
contractors with low compliance.
140. See supra subsection V.C.1.
141. See supra Part II.
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4. Government Control of Litigation Limits the Downside of
Private Enforcement
Courts and commentators alike have recognized various potential
downsides of private enforcement; in comparison to public enforce-
ment, for example, private enforcement may result in inconsistent en-
forcement actions, may discourage cooperative efforts, and may
inappropriately burden courts.142  In the FCA context, though, the
DOJ has ultimate control over any private litigation.  The DOJ has
the ability to unilaterally dismiss cases that involve private excess or
improper behavior.143  While the DOJ historically has not aggres-
sively exercised this power,144 it is obligated to conduct due diligence
on every case.145  Taken at face value, such due diligence should en-
able the DOJ to throw out inappropriate litigation that is not in the
public interest.  For example, if the DOJ and the contracting agency
believe that cooperation is a better solution, they can dismiss a
whistleblower’s FCA suit that raises otherwise legally valid claims.146
For all of these reasons, courts should generally permit civil FCA
liability in the context of clear technical regulatory violations.  More
precisely, courts should aim to incorporate the benefits and losses of
competition into the determination of civil FCA liability for clear tech-
nical regulatory violations.  As a practical matter, courts should pre-
sume the existence of unfair competition when a company commits a
clear regulatory violation, and the cost of compliance should be a
rough estimate of the damage award under the civil FCA.
VII. CONCERNS
A. Materiality
Prior to FERA’s 2009 express introduction of “materiality” into the
FCA, some courts read in a materiality requirement into the statute in
an effort to limit liability.  The Ninth, Fourth, and Sixth Circuits
adopted a “natural tendency” test for materiality, focusing on the po-
tential effect of the false statement rather than the actual effect.147  In
142. See, e.g., Stephen B. Burbank, Sean Farhang & Herbert M. Kritzer, Private En-
forcement, 17 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 637, 667 (2013); David Kwok, Evidence from
the False Claims Act: Does Private Enforcement Attract Excessive Litigation?, 42
PUB. CONT. L.J. 225, 230–32 (2013).
143. See 31 U.S.C. § 3730(c)(2)(A) (2012).
144. See Kwok, supra note 142, at 240 tbl.2.
145. See 31 U.S.C. § 3730(a) (“The Attorney General diligently shall investigate a
violation . . . .”).
146. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Sequoia Orange Co. v. Baird-Neece Packing Corp.,
151 F.3d 1139, 1144–45 (9th Cir. 1998).
147. See United States v. Bourseau, 531 F.3d 1159, 1171 (9th Cir. 2008); United
States ex rel. Harrison v. Westinghouse Savannah River Co., 352 F.3d 908, 913,
916–17 (4th Cir. 2003); United States ex rel. A+ Homecare, Inc. v. Medshares
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contrast, the Eighth Circuit adopted a more restrictive “outcome ma-
teriality” test, requiring proof that the government actually would
have taken a different action had it known of the fraud.148  FERA in-
cluded a definition of materiality that mirrored the natural tendency
test, arguably rejecting the Eighth Circuit’s approach.149
The condition of payment distinction limiting implied false certifi-
cation is like the disfavored outcome materiality test.  The argument
for requiring a violation to be a condition of payment rather than a
condition of participation is the idea that the outcome of payment
would have been the same if the government had known of the regula-
tory violation.  This narrow interpretation of the fact that regulatory
compliance is a condition of participation rather than a condition of
payment may have some appeal as a bright line rule, but it does not
make sense logically.  If the government would not want a non-compli-
ant company to even participate in a program, why would the govern-
ment want to pay that non-compliant company any money?
As noted earlier, I do not take a stand as to whether, for doctrinal
reasons, materiality should be read into the statute.  This Article’s
proposed market competition framework addresses the underlying
problems of harm and enforcement that I argue underpin courts’ rea-
soning in false certification cases.  Explicit, separate materiality anal-
ysis is duplicative and unnecessary under the false certification
framework.  As a practical matter, I suggest the fact that, in the ag-
gregate, the government expended the effort to promulgate or pass a
regulation is sufficient to demonstrate that compliance with the regu-
lation is per se material.
Thus, if courts continue to pursue explicit materiality analysis,
they should frame it as taking place in a competitive marketplace.
Under this analysis, regulatory violations will be per se material.  Ma-
teriality is defined as “a natural tendency to influence, or be capable of
influencing, the payment or receipt of money or property.”150  One
possible, but flawed, interpretation of this materiality standard would
be to apply it in a non-competitive situation.  As an example, a court
Mgmt. Grp., Inc., 400 F.3d 428, 445 (6th Cir. 2005); SYLVIA supra note 32, at
§ 4.51; see also United States ex rel. Longhi v. United States, 575 F.3d 458, 470
(5th Cir. 2009) (holding that a false statement is material under the False Claims
Act if it has a natural tendency to influence the decision-making body to which it
was addressed).
148. See Rabushka ex rel. United States v. Crane Co., 122 F.3d 559, 563 (8th Cir.
1997) (requiring relator to demonstrate that government would have terminated
a pension plan had it known about misrepresentations and nondisclosures); see
also Bourseau, 531 F.3d at 1171 (citing Costner v. URS Consultants, 153 F.3d
667, 677 (8th Cir. 1998)) (acknowledging the Eighth Circuit’s adoption of the out-
come materiality test).
149. See 31 U.S.C. § 3729(b)(4) (2012).
150. Id.
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might ask in the counterfactual, would the government still have paid
this specific defendant had it known about the technical regulatory
violation?  This question, I argue, is an excessively cramped view of
materiality.  Rather, the proper question regarding materiality should
include the presence of competitors.  Given the market for services to
the government, would knowledge of this technical regulatory viola-
tion have influenced the government’s decision to select and pay any
defendant?  Unless everyone systematically commits this technical
regulatory violation, it seems reasonable to believe that any govern-
ment agency would rather pay money to an entity that complied with
all requirements rather than one that did not comply with all require-
ments.  Regulatory violations therefore will generally be per se
material.
B. Overcriminalization
Part of the underlying concern regarding civil FCA liability for reg-
ulatory violations may be a fear of overcriminalization; courts do not
want to be seen as exacting undue punishment.151  Careful separation
of civil and criminal FCA cases will help highlight the distinctive role
of civil sanctions outside of the punitive realm.  One basic step to aid
in the development of civil FCA doctrine is to clearly distinguish crim-
inal versus civil doctrines under the FCA.  The Fourth Circuit, for ex-
ample, has acknowledged this criminal/civil distinction, rejecting
application of the rule of lenity in a civil FCA case because the rule as
expressed in United States v. McNinch152 was appropriate only for the
criminal FCA.153
Unfortunately, the Fourth Circuit has also been willing to conflate
both forms of liability.  In United States ex rel. Nathan v. Takeda
Pharmacaceuticals North America, Inc., the court was reluctant to in-
terpret the FCA’s language of a “claim” in a broad sense, relying on
the criminal justice principle of narrow statutory construction in cit-
ing Harrison and McNinch.154  Both Harrison and McNinch were con-
cerned about punishment; the Fourth Circuit should not have applied
those decisions in Takeda.
The fact that a claim is solely under the civil FCA, though, does not
preclude the possibility that it still may be punitive in nature.  The
civil sanctions may be so great as to be punitive rather than compen-
151. See United States ex rel. Hobbs v. MedQuest Assocs., Inc., 711 F.3d 707, 717 (6th
Cir. 2013).
152. 356 U.S. 595 (1958).
153. See Harrison v. Westinghouse Savannah River Co., 176 F.3d 776, 786 (4th Cir.
1999) (rejecting application of McNinch, 356 U.S. at 598, because it concerned
criminal FCA).
154. United States ex rel. Nathan v. Takeda Pharm. N. Am., Inc., 707 F.3d at 456 (4th
Cir. 2013); Harrison, 176 F.3d at 785; McNinch, 356 U.S. at 599.
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satory in nature, and the Supreme Court has struggled with this
issue.
The Supreme Court first directly addressed this question in United
States v. Bornstein, which discussed an earlier version of the FCA.155
At the time, the FCA offered double damages, unlike the modern
treble damages statute.156  The Court held that the FCA’s double
damages were compensatory in nature, serving the “make-whole” pur-
pose of the FCA.157  Of note, the Court expressly rejected the idea that
double damages were compensatory because the government did not
receive the full double damages but had to pay out a potential relator’s
share.158  In Bornstein, there was no relator to be paid, but the Court
still held that double damages were necessary to “compensate the
Government completely for the costs, delays, and inconveniences occa-
sioned by fraudulent claims.”159  The Court noted that the relator’s
share had varied over time, even though the double damages provision
had not changed.160  Overall, “The device of double damages plus a
specific sum was chosen to make sure that the government would be
made completely whole.”161
In contrast, the majority in Vermont Agency of Natural Resources
v. United States ex rel. Stevens described the FCA as “essentially puni-
tive” in a secondary line of argument whose importance is unclear.162
Stevens concerned a non-intervened FCA action; the United States
was not an active party to the litigation.163  The Court held that, as a
matter of statutory interpretation, Congress did not intend for states
to be a “person” subject to FCA liability.164  Six Justices signed onto
the Court’s opinion.  The second of three arguments supporting the
Court’s conclusion that states are not subject to FCA liability was a
presumption against the imposition of punitive damages on govern-
mental entities, and that the FCA’s damages were “essentially puni-
tive.”165  The Court, however, did not discuss the relevance of the
relator’s share in analyzing treble damages as punitive.166
Moreover, Justices Breyer and Ginsburg signed onto a concurring
opinion indicating that they left “open the question whether the word
155. United States v. Bornstein, 423 U.S. 303 (1976).
156. See id. at 314.
157. Id. at 314–15.
158. Id. at 315 n.11.
159. Id. at 315.
160. Id. at 315 n.11.
161. Id. at 314 (quoting United States ex rel. Marcus v. Hess, 317 U.S. 537, 551–52
(1943)) (internal quotation mark omitted).
162. Vt. Agency of Natural Res. v. United States ex rel. Stevens, 529 U.S. 765, 784–85
(2000).
163. Id. at 770.
164. Id. at 783–87.
165. Id. at 784–85.
166. See id.
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‘person’ encompasses States when the U.S. itself sues under the False
Claims Act.”167  They therefore thought the fact that the United
States declined to intervene was significant in the analysis of whether
States could be held liable.168  Justices Stevens and Souter rejected
the Court’s statutory interpretation, arguing that States were persons
subject to FCA liability but their decision did not hinge on
punitiveness.169
A unanimous Supreme Court later referenced Stevens and equivo-
cated on the punitive nature of FCA liability in Cook County v. United
States ex rel. Chandler, claiming that “the tipping point between
payback and punishment defies general formulation . . . .”170  The
Court affirmed Bornstein in the compensatory need for liability be-
yond the amount of the fraud.171  The Court recognized relator pay-
ment as a relevant cost, and it also affirmed that treble damages may
be “necessary for full recovery even when there is no qui tam relator to
be paid.”172  The Court referenced the lack of prejudgment interest
and the lack of consequential damages under the FCA as relevant to
the compensatory nature of treble damages.173
As reflected in Chandler, the Supreme Court presently rejects the
idea that the civil FCA is inherently punitive in nature, but as ap-
plied, civil FCA sanctions may be entirely compensatory or they may
incorporate punitive elements.  Courts should therefore be aware of
potentially punitive applications of the civil FCA when only compen-
sation, and not punishment, is justified.  That being said, courts
should not automatically assume that the existence of treble damages
or a per-claim penalty in the FCA makes any civil FCA sanction puni-
tive in nature.  Rather than a binary decision ruling out FCA liability,
courts should continue with the existing process of evaluating whether
civil sanctions as applied, bearing in mind competitive harm, violate
the Excessive Fines Clause of the Eighth Amendment.174
167. Id. at 789 (Ginsburg & Breyer, JJ., concurring).
168. See id.
169. See id. at 789–802 (Stevens & Souter, JJ., dissenting).
170. Cook Cnty. v. United States ex rel. Chandler, 538 U.S. 119, 130 (2003) 538 U.S.
119, 130 (2003).
171. Id.
172. Id. at 131.
173. Id.
174. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Bunk v. Gosselin World Wide Moving, N.V., 741
F.3d 390, 405 (4th Cir. 2013); United States v. Mackby, 261 F.3d 821, 831 (9th
Cir. 2001).  But see United States v. Rogan, 517 F.3d 449, 453–54 (7th Cir. 2008)
(holding it unclear whether the Excessive Fines Clause applies to civil actions
under FCA).
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C. Excessive Compliance Costs
Expansive FCA liability for clear regulatory violations may trigger
excessive compliance costs, particularly if regulatory agencies fail to
exercise their duty to oversee FCA actions.  It is possible, for example,
that agencies might ignore cost-benefit analysis and simply pursue de-
fendants for maximum settlements.
Alternatively, there may be regulatory violations that are justifia-
ble.  Regulations may not be sufficiently comprehensive to cover every
scenario, and there may be cases where application of a strict rule is
not justifiable.  We might think of these as “efficient” regulatory viola-
tions, analogous to “efficient breach” in contract law, and penalizing
defendants for such breaches may not be desirable.
In the short term, defendants may feel this scenario is unfair and
detrimental to society; why should a company be compelled to follow a
regulation in which the costs outweigh the total benefits?  Nonethe-
less, I suggest that this problem is self-correcting in the medium term.
First, if companies are aware that strict compliance is necessary, they
will either price their services accordingly or exit the government mar-
ket.  There will be market and political pressure on the agency to ei-
ther revise the rules or explicitly modify enforcement patterns.
Second, if some companies deviate from compliance, there will be an
incentive under the FCA for competitors and whistleblowers to file lit-
igation such that all companies must comply or face additional civil
sanctions.  For both of these reasons, agencies will face pressure to
address the cost of compliance for regulated companies and to exercise
better control over potential litigation.
D. Stigmatic Concerns in Incorporating Technical
Violations
Allowing FCA liability for attenuated causation issues may raise
the problem of excessive stigmatic harm by lumping defendants with
varying levels of moral culpability together.  A healthcare provider
committing fraud by collecting Medicare payments for which no ser-
vice was provided could be liable under the FCA, as could a Hobbs-
style provider who did provide real, medically necessary services.
I suggest that on the balance, there is actually insufficient stig-
matic harm under the FCA.  As stated in that statute, the FCA ad-
dresses false claims.  Falsity is a less morally laden description in
comparison to fraud.175  Only certain portions of the FCA actually re-
quire fraudulent intent.176  Thus, for a defendant that commits out-
right fraud through non-delivery of service, there is probably
175. Fraud incorporates the intent to deceive for the purposes of causing some loss.
See, e.g., United States v. Hawkey, 148 F.3d 920 (8th Cir. 1998).
176. See, e.g., 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(1)(E) (2012).
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insufficient stigmatic harm in FCA liability.  Nonetheless, to the ex-
tent that there may be excessive stigmatic harm through the aggrega-
tion of fraud and falsity in the statute, the DOJ could seek to alleviate
this harm by emphasizing the falsity aspect in press releases.
Another solution would be to pursue civil remedies under the doc-
trine of unjust enrichment.177  For those knowledgeable about the doc-
trine of unjust enrichment, civil liability here incorporates the
possibility that the defendant did no wrong but was simply the un-
knowing recipient of unjust gains.  While this might reduce stigmatic
harm to the defendant, it is unlikely given the need to understand the
doctrinal details.  The “unjust” portion of the label may have sufficient
stigmatic power against the defendant for those reading the popular
press.  Moreover, proceeding under unjust enrichment removes the po-
tential of damage multipliers under the FCA that help cover the en-
forcement costs of technical contract violations.
One other potential avenue of enforcement is to proceed under ex-
isting unfair competition law.178  This analysis is presently outside
the scope of this Article, but I note that the level of moral condemna-
tion for unfair competition is unclear in comparison to making a false
claim with the federal government.
E. Increased Liability Only for Those with Government
Contracts
This proposal will create some differential in regulatory enforce-
ment; companies in various industries may be subject to the same reg-
ulations on paper, but the presence of FCA liability will likely increase
enforcement efforts against the subsection of companies that do busi-
ness with the federal government.  Companies that do not conduct
business directly with the federal government may be subject to simi-
lar regulations, but whistleblowers will not have the same incentive
under the FCA to raise regulatory violations against them.  I have ear-
lier discussed the issue of overenforcement and the DOJ’s ability to
control that element; the concern I raise here is the distinctive issue of
comparatively lesser enforcement for companies not doing business
with the federal government.  The existence of effectively higher com-
pliance requirements may drive costs higher in government contracts.
This is, though, likely what the government explicitly intended when
passing laws and regulations mandating such behavior.  Additionally,
there have been numerous arguments raised suggesting why the fed-
eral government is particularly vulnerable to fraud and contractual
violations, distinct from other private entities: the government does a
poor job of monitoring private performance, government contractual
177. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 41 (2011).
178. See generally RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION (1995).
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complexity is high, and third parties are often the direct beneficiary of
services paid for by the government.179  The government’s distinctive
vulnerability to contractual and regulatory violations helps justify the
need for further enforcement via FCA liability.
F. Potentially Anti-Competitive Application of FCA Liability
It is possible that generally allowing civil FCA liability for regula-
tory non-compliance may be anti-competitive in reality.  If only a lim-
ited number of companies are capable of compliance and maintaining
profitability, greater enforcement of technical regulations may result
in a lower number companies in the marketplace.
FCA litigation, however, is unlikely to lead in this direction.  Rela-
tors and relators’ counsel, like many plaintiffs, must earn a living and
the natural target would be to identify deep pocketed defendants.
These defendants are also the entities most likely to have sufficient
funds to pay for better compliance.
Second, regulations may be drafted with multiple intents.  At one
end of the spectrum, regulations may legitimately be in the public in-
terest, while at the other end, some regulations may be solely to re-
strict competition.  If regulatory compliance is in the public interest,
the loss in competition is assumedly in the cost-benefit calculation
used in establishing the regulation.  If the regulations tend towards
competition restriction, this is a variant of regulatory capture.  I sug-
gest that it is unclear whether private enforcement will exacerbate or
reduce the impact of regulatory capture.  Nonetheless, if courts are
willing to address this concern of potentially anti-competitive impact,
they can do so with some additional refinement of liability analysis.
First, we must acknowledge that regulations themselves may have
disparate impacts on the competitive marketplace, and second, the en-
forcement regime may either mitigate or exacerbate such problems.
Regulatory compliance may have different impacts on companies.
Let us consider two different archetypes of compliance costs: fixed and
variable.  A fixed compliance cost is a one-time cost incurred by a com-
pany; regardless of the volume of widgets produced or services ren-
dered, the fixed compliance cost is the same.  In contrast, variable
compliance costs increase when the volume of widgets produced or ser-
vices rendered increases.
Note, then, that fixed compliance costs are more easily born by
larger, more productive companies.  Those large companies can spread
the fixed compliance costs across a large volume of goods and services.
If the volume is sufficiently large, there may be no measurable impact
on the price the large company can charge its customers.  A small com-
179. See Michael Holt & Gregory Klass, Implied Certification Under the False Claims
Act, 41 PUB. CONT. L.J. 1, 13 (2011).
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pany, in comparison, may have to increase the price of its goods or
services to cover the fixed compliance costs.
Congress and agencies have recognized this type of disparate im-
pact of regulations across the size of organizations.  For example,
OSHA requires employers to record and report injuries, death, and
illnesses,180 but it exempts employers with fewer than ten employ-
ees.181  The SEC was similarly concerned about the impact of requir-
ing smaller companies to comply with the same internal controls and
auditing standards as those of larger companies.182  Ostensibly simi-
lar logic allows smaller employers to avoid the requirement of offering
leave for childbirth.183
While there have been clear attempts to ameliorate the regulatory
burdens on smaller companies, there will continue to be disparities in
compliance impact.  There is little reason to believe, for example, that
an employer with eleven employees is substantially better equipped to
handle OSHA reporting requirements than an employer with nine em-
ployees, despite the bright line rule above.184
Overall, larger companies are less likely to be competitively disad-
vantaged by a regulatory scheme.  As noted in section IV.C, there are
reasons to believe that there is underenforcement of technical regula-
tory requirements that favor larger companies; therefore, greater en-
forcement would reduce the large company advantage.  Nonetheless,
it is possible FCA litigation itself might become disproportionately fo-
cused on smaller companies if private relators view smaller companies
as easier targets.  Another factor may be whether larger companies
explicitly invest in pursuing litigation against smaller companies.
In light of these concerns, there are a number of adaptations courts
could make in focusing more on developing the competitive market.
180. 29 C.F.R. § 1904.0 (2014).
181. 29 C.F.R. § 1904.1.
182. The Commission stated: “However, we are sensitive that many small business
issuers may experience difficulty in evaluating their internal control over finan-
cial reporting because these issuers may not have as formal or well-structured a
system . . . .”  Financial Reporting and Certification of Disclosure in Exchange
Act, 68 Fed. Reg. 36636 (June 18, 2003) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 210, 228,
229, 240, 249, 270, and 274).  In 2005, the SEC again deferred the deadline, stat-
ing: “Due to the significant costs that smaller companies are likely to incur to
prepare for initial compliance with the internal control requirements, we think
that it is critical to [extend the deadline].”  Financial Reporting and Certification
of Disclosure in Exchange Act, 70 Fed. Reg. 56825 (Sept. 29, 2005) (to be codified
at 17 C.F.R. pts. 210, 228, 229, 240, and 249).  In 2010, the Commission perma-
nently exempted small issuers from the requirement.  Financial Reporting in Ex-
change Act Periodic Reports of Non-Accelerated Filers, 75 Fed. Reg. 57385 (Sept.
21, 2010) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 210, 229, and 249).
183. The Family Medical Leave Act (FMLA) only covers employers with fifty or more
employees that work for more than twenty weeks per year.  29 C.F.R. § 825.104
(defining “covered employers”).
184. See 29 C.F.R. § 1904.1.
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One option would be to look at the competitive landscape and simply
reject liability in situations that would decrease competition in the
marketplace.  As acknowledged earlier, this form of analysis is chal-
lenging.  Another option would be to impose civil liability for regula-
tory violations for particular classes of violations.  As described above,
requiring variable cost compliance tends to be more equitable across
various sized competitors.  Courts might thus rule out civil liability for
fixed cost regulatory violations.
Again, this would have the potential downside of reducing actual
compliance and enforcement efforts with valuable regulations that
happen to look like fixed cost issues.
VIII. CONCLUSION
Fraud comes in many forms, and the distinctive capabilities of the
civil False Claims Act uniquely position it to be effective in developing
a fair competitive marketplace for government services.  Unlike crimi-
nal fraud sanctions, which emphasize punishment of wrongdoing, I
propose that the FCA recognizes the harm to both the government and
to market competitors due to falsity and failures in the government
contracts.  Even low levels of falsity, in the form of clear contractual or
regulatory violations, cause real harm in the marketplace because
compliance is costly.  These harms sooner or later result in losses to
the government.  By embracing the distinctive advantages of FCA lia-
bility over criminal fraud charges, courts can address these harms and
provide compensation to the government and possibly to competitors.
The significant involvement of the DOJ and other government agen-
cies in the FCA process ensures that courts can set bright line rules in
establishing a presumption of competitive harm in instances of clear
regulatory violations.  Rather than existing formalistic doctrine that
adds uncertainty and needless complexity, whistleblowers, govern-
ment agencies, and competitors all benefit from a principled rule es-
tablishing that clear regulatory violations are actionable under the
FCA.
